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Abstract
We study the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1999), but
allow for the use of lottery and monetary transfer as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992,
1994). We therefore unify two well-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches
of implementation theory. We first show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary
and sufficient condition for pure-strategy Nash implementation by a direct mechanism.
Second, taking mixed strategies into consideration, we show that Maskin monotonicity
is a necessary and sufficient condition for mixed-strategy Nash implementation by a
finite (albeit indirect) mechanism. Third, we extend our analysis to implementation
in rationalizable strategies. In contrast to previous papers, our approach possesses
many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite mechanisms (with no integer or
modulo game) are used; mixed strategies are handled explicitly; neither transfer nor
bad outcomes are used on the equilibrium path; our mechanism is robust to information
perturbations; and the size of off-equilibrium transfers can be made arbitrarily small.
Finally, our result can be extended to continuous settings and ordinal settings.
∗We thank Olivier Bochet, Kim-Sau Chung, Eddie Dekel, Navin Kartik, Claudio Mezzetti, Christoph
Mueller, Daisuke Nakajima, Kym Pram, Hamid Sabourian, Arunava Sen, Roberto Serrano, and Bala´zs
Szentes for helpful comments. Part of this paper was written while the authors were visiting Academia
Sinica, and we would like to thank the institution for its hospitality and support.
†Department of Economics, National University of Singapore. Email: ecsycc@nus.edu.sg
‡School of Economics, Singapore Management University. Email: tkunimoto@smu.edu.sg
§School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics.
Email: sunyifei@uibe.edu.cn
¶Department of Economics, University of Bristol. Email: siyang.xiong@bristol.ac.uk
1
Although the theory of implementation has been quite successful in identifying
the social choice functions which can be implemented in different informational
settings, a nagging criticism of the theory is that the mechanisms used in the
general constructive proofs have “unnatural” features. A natural response to this
criticism is that the mechanisms in the constructive proofs are designed to apply to
a broad range of environments and social choice functions. Given this versatility,
it is not surprising that the mechanisms possess questionable features. With this
in mind, we would hope that for particular settings and social choice functions
we could find “natural” mechanisms with desirable properties. To the extent that
there are social choice functions which we can only implement using questionable
mechanisms, the existing theory of implementation is inadequate.
—Jackson (1992, pp. 757-758)
1 Introduction
Mechanism design can be seen as reverse engineering of game theory. Suppose that a society
has decided on a social choice rule – a recipe for choosing the socially optimal alternatives on
the basis of individuals’ preferences over alternatives. To implement the social choice rule,
a mechanism designer chooses a game/mechanism so that the equilibrium outcomes of the
mechanism coincide with the social outcomes designated by the choice rule.
There are two prominent paradigms in the theory of implementation—partial imple-
mentation and full implementation. One critical difference between the two paradigms is
that the former requires that one equilibrium outcome achieve the social choice rule, while
the latter requires that all equilibrium outcomes be socially desirable. Conventional wis-
dom suggests that many fewer social choice rules can be fully implemented; even when they
can be, this is often accomplished by invoking more complicated indirect mechanisms. The
historical development of these two paradigms, however, also leads to another important,
and perhaps unexpected, difference: full implementation usually focuses on general social
choice environments, while partial implementation/mechanism design is explored mainly in
economic environments in which both lotteries and monetary transfer are available. Indeed,
while economic theory has gone a long way around the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility
theorem by exploiting dominant-strategy mechanisms in quasilinear environments, we do
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not observe a similar development in full Nash implementation due to Maskin (1977, 1999).
In this paper, we study the full Nash implementation problem but allow for lotteries and
monetary transfer. We focus on the monotonicity condition (hereafter, Maskin monotonicity)
which Maskin shows is necessary and “almost sufficient” for Nash implementation. We aim to
implement Maskin-monotonic social choice functions (henceforth, SCFs) in pure or mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium by mechanisms with no questionable feature. Specifically, we
restrict attention to finite mechanisms that make use of neither the integer game device nor
the modulo game device which prevails in the full implementation literature.1
In the integer game, each player announces some integer and the person who announces
the highest integer becomes a dictator. In the absence of a common best outcome, an in-
teger game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibria. This questionable feature is also shared
by a modulo game. The modulo game is considered a finite version of the integer game in
which agents announce integers from a finite set. The agent whose identification matches
the modulo of the sum of the integers gets to name the allocation. In order to “knock out”
undesirable equilibria in general environments, most constructive proofs in the literature
have taken advantage of the fact that the integer/modulo game has no solution. In par-
ticular, without imposing any domain restriction on the (even finite) environment, Jackson
(1992, Example 4) shows that it is generally impossible to achieve the mixed-strategy Nash
implementation of a Maskin-monotonic SCF by a finite mechanism.2
Abreu and Matsushima (henceforth, AM, 1992, 1994) also studied full implementation
problem in environments with lottery and transfer. AM obtain permissive implementation
results using finite mechanisms without the aforementioned questionable features.3 How-
ever, AM do not investigate Nash implementation but rather appeal to a different notion
of implementation: virtual implementation in Abreu and Matsushima (1992) or exact im-
plementation under iterated weak dominance in Abreu and Matsushima (1994).4 Virtual
1More precisely, the implementing mechanism which we construct is finite as long as each agent has only
finitely many possible preferences. We consider infinite environments in Section 7.3 where we construct
infinite yet well-behaved implementing mechanisms.
2Nevertheless, our Theorem 7.2 shows that the SCF which Jackson (1992) constructs can be implemented
in mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in a finite mechanism with arbitrarily small off-equilibrium transfers.
3To be precise, Abreu and Matsushima (1992) do not need transfers but rather assume existence of
lotteries only. “Reducing the probability of a favorable social choice outcome” in their setup plays the same
role of “penalizing players by decreasing transfer” in our setup.
4Iterated weak dominance in Abreu and Matsushima (1994) also yields the unique undominated Nash
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implementation means that the planner contents herself with implementing the SCF with
arbitrarily high probability.5 In contrast, by studying exact Nash implementation in the
specific setting, we unify the two well-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches to
implementation theory due to Maskin (1999) and AM. Our exercise is directly comparable
to Maskin (1999) and highlights the pivotal trade-off between the class of environments and
the feature of implementing mechanisms. We consider this as a major step in advancing
Jackson’s (1992) research program, cited in the beginning of this section.
Our first result (Theorem 1) establishes a revelation principle for pure-strategy Nash
implementation by making use of monetary transfer alone. Specifically, we show that with
three or more agents, every Maskin-monotonic SCF is fully implementable in pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium by a direct mechanism. In the direct mechanism, each agent announces
only a state (which consists of the agents’ preference profile) and hence, the mechanism
employs neither integer games nor modulo games. The result also involves no randomization
and contrasts with the folk understanding that direct mechanisms are generally inadequate
for full implementation.
While the direct mechanism in Theorem 1 is finite and possesses nice properties, it
might admit mixed-strategy equilibria whose outcomes are not socially desirable. Our second
result (Theorem 2) shows that as long as there are two agents, Maskin monotonicity is
a necessary and sufficient condition for mixed-strategy Nash implementation by a finite
mechanism.6 In the finite mechanism, each agent is asked to announce his type twice in
addition to reporting the state. Once again, the result makes use of neither integer games
equilibrium outcome. For undominated Nash implementation by finite mechanisms, see also Jackson et al.
(1994) and Sjostrom (1994).
5Virtual implementation allows for the possibility that an outcome not in the SCF is selected with positive
probability even on the equilibrium path. This feature is problematic in situations where the planner is free
to renege. Specifically, if agents believe that the planner will not adopt a questionable outcome x when (s)he
knows (according to the equilibrium) that a different outcome y is an element of the SCF, the equilibrium
falls apart. The random mechanism which we adopt do not share this issue, since no randomization takes
place in equilibrium, and out of equilibrium the planner will not know if any particular outcome belongs to
the SCF. See (Benoˆıt and Ok, 2008, Section 3.3) for more discussion.
6In addition, if the SCF satisfies Maskin monotonicity in the restricted domain without transfer, we show
that it is implementable in mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium by a finite mechanism such that the size of
transfers remains zero on the equilibrium path and can be made arbitrarily small off the equilibrium path
(Theorem 5).
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nor refinements which are by far the standard way to handle mixed-strategy equilibria.
Indeed, with refinements of Nash equilibria such as undominated Nash equilibrium or
subgame-perfection equilibrium, essentially any (monotonic or non-monotonic) SCF is im-
plementable in a complete-information environment.7 However, Chung and Ely (2003) and
Aghion et al. (2012) have pointed out that if we were to achieve exact implementation in
refinements which is robust to a “small amount of incomplete information,” Maskin mono-
tonicity would come back as a necessary condition. Indeed, we invoke Theorem 2 to verify
that Maskin monotonicity is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for exact and
robust implementation in Nash equilibrium and hence also in any refinement (Proposition
1).8
For our third result, we study the notion of rationalizable implementation due to Berge-
mann et al. (2011). Specifically, in Theorem 3 we show that as long as there are two agents,
an SCF is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism if and only if
it satisfies Maskin monotonicity∗, a condition proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011).9 Any
Maskin-monotonic SCF that is responsive/injective satisfies Maskin monotonicity∗. The im-
plementing mechanism is obtained by modifying the implementing mechanism of Theorem 2.
The result implies AM’s result in our environment, i.e., any SCF is virtually implementable in
rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism. Moreover, it also follows that every Maskin-
monotonic∗ SCF is continuously implementable – another notion of implementation proposed
by Oury and Tercieux (2012) which is robust to a broader class of information perturbations
than those considered in Chung and Ely (2003) and Aghion et al. (2012).
7See, for instance, Moore and Repullo (1988), Abreu and Sen (1991), Palfrey and Srivastava (1991),
and Abreu and Matsushima (1994). In an economic environment similar to ours, Moore and Repullo
(1988) construct a simple mechanism with no mixed strategy “subgame-perfect” equilibria, while Abreu
and Matsushima (1994), Jackson et al. (1994), and Sjostrom (1994) construct a finite mechanism with no
mixed-strategy “undominated” Nash equilibria.
8Harsanyi (1973) shows that a mixed Nash equilibrium outcome may occur as the limit of a sequence of
pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria for “nearby games” in which players are uncertain about the exact
profile of preferences. Hence, ignoring mixed strategy equilibria would be particularly problematic if we were
to achieve implementation which is robust to information perturbations.
9By making use of integer games, Bergemann et al. (2011) show that Maskin monotonicity∗ is a necessary
and almost sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation by a mechanism satisfying the best response
peorpty (e.g., a finite mechanism). See Bergemann et al. (2011) for the definition of the best response
property.
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To sum up, we list our main results as follows:
• Pure-Strategy Nash Implementation (Theorem 1): When there are at least three
agents, Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for pure-strategy
Nash implementation by a direct mechanism.
• Mixed-Strategy Nash Implementation (Theorem 2): When there are two or more
agents, Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for mixed-strategy
Nash implementation by a finite mechanism.
• Rationalizable Implementation (Theorem 3): When there are two or more agents,
Maskin monotonicity∗ is a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable imple-
mentation by a finite mechanism.
We also provide several extensions of our main results. First, we extend our mixed-
strategy Nash implementation result to cover social choice correspondences (i.e., multivalued
social choice rules) which Maskin (1999) as well as many other papers have studied. For-
mally, we show that when there are at least three agents, any Maskin-monotonic social
choice correspondence (henceforth, SCC) is mixed-strategy Nash implementable (Theorem
4). Furthermore, if the range of the SCC is a finite set, we guarantee that the implementing
mechanism is still finite. Second, we show that if the SCF satisfies Maskin monotonicity
in the restricted domain without transfer, then it is implementable in mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium by a finite mechanism in which the size of transfers remains zero on the equilibria
and can be made arbitrarily small off the equilibria (Theorem 5).
Third, we consider an infinite setting which the state space is a compact set, and
the utility functions and the SCF are continuous. In this setting, we show that Maskin
monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for mixed-strategy Nash implementation
by a mechanism with a compact message space, a continuous outcome function, and a
continuous transfer rule (Theorem 6). Such an extension to an infinite setting is by far not
available in the literature, even for virtual implementation.10 This extension covers many
applications and verifies that our finite setting is indeed a good approximation of settings
with a continuum of states.
10This was a prominent open question that was raised in Section 5 of Abreu and Matsushima (1992), and
which remains open to the best of our knowledge.
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The extension to an infinite setting yields a further interesting extension. Specifically,
in proving Theorem 2, we have assumed that each agent is an expected utility maximizer
with a fixed cardinal utility function over pure outcomes. This raises the question as to
whether our result is an artifact of the fixed finite set of cardinalizations. To answer the
question, we adopt the concept of ordinal Nash implementation proposed by Mezzetti and
Renou (2012). The notion requires that a single mechanism achieve mixed-strategy Nash
implementation for any cardinal representation of preferences over lotteries. We say that
an SCF satisfies ordinal Maskin monotonicity if it is Maskin-monotonic for any cardinal
representation. By making use of our implementing mechanism in the infinite setting, we
show that ordinal Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for ordinal
Nash implementation (Theorem 7).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses two examples to illustrate
the main idea of the paper. In Section 3, we present the basic setup and definitions. Sec-
tion 4 studies pure-strategy Nash implementation in a direct mechanism. Section 5 studies
mixed-strategy Nash implementation in a finite mechanism and its robustness to information
perturbations. Section 6 studies rationalizable implementation. We discuss the extensions
of our Nash implementation result in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 An Illustration of Our Mechanism and Results
We provide two examples to illustrate our main result on implementation in mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium. In the first example, we illustrate the essential features of the implement-
ing mechanism which we propose and how it works. In the second example, we argue that
Maskin monotonicity is a mild requirement in a bilateral trading environment, a prominent
applied setting of implementation theory.
2.1 Example 1: King Solomon’s Dilemma
Two women came to King Solomon with a baby and both claimed to be the baby’s true
mother. King Solomon faced the problem of finding out which of them was the true mother
of the baby. Denote the two mothers by Anna (A) and Bess (B). Let a be the alternative
of giving the baby to Anna and b the alternative of giving the baby to Bess. In the original
setup, King Solomon introduces another alternative c, which is to cut the baby in half. We
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write α (β) as the state where A (B) is the true mother. King Solomon’s goal is summarized
by an SCF f mapping from the set of states {α, β} to outcomes {a, b, c} such that f (α) = a
and f (β) = b, i.e., his goal is to give the baby to the true mother. Both mothers know which
of them is the true mother, but King Solomon does not.
In the original setup, Anna has the preference order a αA b αA c at state α and
a βA c βA b at state β, whereas Bess has the preference order b αB c αB a at state α, and
b βB a βB c in state β. Maskin monotonicity of f requires that if the desired outcome f (θ)
(where θ = α or β) never moves down any agent’s rankings in switching from state θ to state
θ′, then f (θ) must continue to be the desired outcome in state θ′ (see Definition 2). Here,
for instance, when the state switches from α to β, f (α) = a stays the same in mother A’s
ranking and goes up mother B’s ranking among the three alternatives. Yet, f (β) is different
from f (α). Hence, f is not Maskin-monotonic and not implementable in Nash equilibrium.
The situation is different once we introduce transfers. To be precise, suppose that we
now denote the true mother’s valuation of getting the baby by v¯ and the false mother’s
valuation by v where v¯ is higher than v and both positive. A mother who values the baby
at v and receives transfer t derives utility v + t if she gets the baby and transfer t.
We use a triplet to denote an outcome or allocation (l,−tA,−tB), where l denotes a
lottery over a and b which determines who gets the baby and ti is the payment of mother
i. In the setup, we write the SCF as f (α) = (a, 0, 0) and f (β) = (b, 0, 0). Then, when the
state switches from α to β, the social outcome f (α) moves down mother A’s ranking against
the allocation
yA ≡ (b,−vm, 0) (1)
where vm =
v+v¯
2
. In other words, at state α, mother A would strictly prefer keeping the baby
to selling the baby to mother B at price vm while such preference order is reversed when
the state is β. Symmetrically, in switching from state β to state α, the social outcome f (β)
moves down mother B’s ranking against the allocation
yB ≡ (a, , 0,−vm) . (2)
Hence, f satisfies Maskin monotonicity.
The usual interpretation is that mother A (B) can serve as the “whistle blower” to
knock out a bad equilibrium resulted from a (mis-)reported state α (β) by proposing allo-
cation yA (yB) when the state is actually β (α). Such whistle-blowing is credible, since the
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allocation yA (yB) would be worse than the social outcome under state α (β). That is, the
“right mother” has incentive to blow the whistle if and only if she is supposed to do so.
2.1.1 The Mechanism
We now provide a finite mechanism which implements King Solomon’s SCF in mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium. In the mechanism, each mother i is asked to submit three separate
envelopes. Each of the envelopes contains a state written in a card. We denote the three
envelopes submitted by mother i as m1i ,m
2
i , and m
3
i , respectively. This mechanism consists
of two parts such that each agent’s final utility is the sum of the utility from the two parts.
The first part defines the allocation rule as follows:
Rule 1: If m2A = m
3
A = m
2
B = m
3
B = θ˜ (i.e., the two mothers’ second and third envelopes
all match), then implement (f(θ˜), 0, 0).
Rule 2: Otherwise, we trigger Rule 2-1 with small probability ε and Rule 2-2 with proba-
bility 1− ε:
Rule 2-1 (dictator lottery): the outcome is determined by the mothers’ first envelopes
which is described as follows:
m1B = α m
1
B = β
m1A = α yA
1
2
yA +
1
2
yB
m1A = β
1
2
yA +
1
2
yB yB
where yA and yB are defined as in (1) and (2), and
1
2
yA +
1
2
yB denote the lottery in which
both yA and yB have probability
1
2
.
Rule 2-2 (whistle blower): the outcome is determined by the mothers’ third envelopes
which is described as follows:
m3B = α m
3
B = β
m3A = α yA
1
2
yA +
1
2
yB
m3A = β
1
2
yA +
1
2
yB yB
The second part defines a tansfer rule which we use to discipline the two mothers’
announcements. For each mother i and mother j 6= i, the payment is defined as follows
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(where η > v¯):
m2A = m
2
B m
2
A 6= m2B
m2i = m
1
j m
2
i 6= m1j
The payments of agent i : 0 −η η
In words, if both mothers report the same state in their second envelope, then mother
i makes no payment. Otherwise, we distinguish two cases: (i) if mother i’s second report
matches mother j’s first report, mother i receives a reward η; (ii) if mother i’s second report
does not match mother j’s first report, then mother i pays a penalty η.
Observation (F): For each mother i, the first envelope affects her payoff only when Rule
2-1 is triggered; moreover, once Rule 2-1 is triggered with positive probability, bother mother
must strictly prefer reporting the true state in the first envelope.
2.1.2 The Implementation in Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
We now show that the mechanism implements King Solomon’s SCF in mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Suppose that θ is the true state. We first argue that truth-telling (i.e., mi =
(θ, θ, θ) for each mother i = A,B) constitutes a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. That is, we
claim that any unilateral deviation from truth-telling is not profitable. First, a false report
in the second envelope leads to the penalty of η and hence cannot be a profitable deviation.
Second, a truthful report in the second envelope together with a false report in the third
envelope also leads to a worse outcome: either the true mother pays money to get the baby
instead of getting it for free, or the false mother buys the baby at the price vm which exceeds
her willingness to pay. Finally, together with a truthful second and third report, any false
report in the first envelope affects neither the allocation nor mother i’s payment.
We next show that under any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium σ, both mothers will
announce the same state θ˜ in both their second and third envelopes with probability one. This
implies that the social outcome f(θ˜) is implemented and no transfer is induced. Furthermore,
by Maskin monotonicity, f(θ˜) must be the desirable social outcome in state θ. Indeed, if
f(θ˜) is not socially desirable, the supposed whistle-blower would find it profitable to choose
a report that is different from θ˜ in her third envelope.
The proof is divided into three steps. Step 1 is “contagion of truth”: if mother j tells
the truth in her first envelope, then mother i must tell the truth in her second envelope.
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Step 2 is “consistency”: both mothers report the same state θ˜ in their second envelope. Step
3 is “no challenge”: both mothers report the same state θ˜ in their third envelope.
Step 1. Contagion of Truth: This step follows from the transfer table above. Indeed, we
can summarize the payment of mother i as the following table:
mother i’s payment m2j = θ m
2
j 6= θ
mi = θ 0 −η
mi 6= θ η 0
Hence, by announcing the true state θ in her second envelope, mother i will save the payment
by η which exceeds v¯, the maximal gain from misreporting in the second envelope.
Step 2. Consistency: We argue that with probability one, both mothers report the
same state in their second envelope. We complete this argument by considering three cases.
For the first case, we assume that both mothers tell the truth with certainty in their first
envelope. Then, the state in the second envelope is the true state θ by Step 1. For the second
case, we suppose that both mothers tell a lie in their first envelope with positive probability.
Observation (F) implies that each mother must believe that with probability one, the other
mother has the same report in the second envelope, say, θ˜. Hence, bother mothers report
the same θ˜ in the second envelope with probability one. Finally, if mother i tells the truth
in her first envelope with certainty, while mother j 6= i lies in her first envelope with positive
probability. First, Step 1 implies that mother j’s report in the second envelope must be
truthful with probability one. Furthermore, as in the second case, mother j who lies in her
first envelope must believe that with probability one mother i has the same report in the
second envelope as j reports. Hence, both mothers announce the same state (truth) in the
second envelope with probability one.
Step 3. No Challenge: By Step 2, both mothers report the same state θ˜ in their second
envelope. First, we claim that θ˜ is the true state. Suppose not. Then, the true mother should
tell the truth in the third envelope, and by doing this with probability 1 − ε she gets the
baby by paying vm. This is better than selling the baby to the false mother at price v¯, with
a small enough ε. However, this triggers Rule 2-1 with positive probability. Hence, both
mothers should tell the truth. By Step 1, θ˜ should be the true state. This is a contradiction.
Finally, it is never a best response for anyone to report a lie in the third envelope against
the truth in the second envelope and hence there is no challenge.
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2.2 Example 2: Bilateral Trade
A seller S has an object for sale to a buyer B. The quality θ of the good is either θL or
θH . The designer can impose transfers and hence the set of outcomes A is the set of triplets
(q, tB, tS) with q ∈ [0, 1] representing the amount of the good being traded, tB is the price
paid by B and tS is the payment received by S. For any outcome (q, tB, tS) , B’s utility is
uB = qv+ tB when the good quality is v, and the seller’s utility is uS = tS − qc. We identify
θH with the pair
(
vH , cH
)
and θL with the pair
(
vL, cL
)
.
We want to implement an efficient allocation rule in which the good is always traded
with a surplus division rule tL ∈ [0, 10] when the state is θL and tH ∈ [0, 14] when the state
is θH . That is, the social choice function we want to implement is f
(
θL
)
=
(
1,−tL, tL) and
f
(
θH
)
=
(
1,−tH , tH). The leading example of Hart and Moore (2003) and Aghion et al.
(2012) sets vH > vL and cH = cL = 0; moreover, tH = vH and tL = vL. That is, the buyer
pays his value and all the surplus goes to the seller.
As we show in the following figure, however, the specification in Hart and Moore (2003)
is a knife-edge case which results in the non-Maskin-monotonicity of f . To see this, we draw
the indifference curves for both buyer and seller for the case with vH > vL and cH > cL = 0.
When the state switches from θL to θH , the buyer can serve as a whistle-blower with the
allocation x
(
θL, θH
)
. Indeed, from state θL to state θH , f
(
θL
)
moves down the buyer’s
ranking against x
(
θL, θH
)
. Likewise, when the state switches from θH to θL, the seller can
serve as a whistle-blower with the allocation x
(
θH , θL
)
. As a result, f is Maskin-monotonic
and in fact it remains so for any surplus division rule. It is also clear from the figure that
if cH = cL = 0 instead, then we can no longer find a room for the test allocation x
(
θH , θL
)
and hence f is no longer Maskin-monotonic.
A typical solution to this problem with a non-Maskin-monotonic SCF is to appeal to
implementation with some refinements. For instance, the well known Irrelevance Theorem
of nonverifiable/indescribable information due to Maskin and Tirole (1999) is based on the
implementation in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium via the Moore-Repullo mechanism.
However, (Aghion et al., 2012, Theorem 3) shows that no finite mechanism, whether it is
static or dynamic, can implement the SCF in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in a manner
that is robust to small information perturbations. In contrast, once we move from the knife-
edge case to have cH > cL ≥ 0, our Theorem 2 implies that the Maskin-monotonic SCF f
12
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US
f(θL)
f(θH )
x(θH , θL)
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(b) non-Maskin-monotonic
can be implemented in mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in a finite mechanism. Moreover,
Proposition 1 shows that the implementation is robust to any small information perturbations
in the sense of Aghion et al. (2012).
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Environment
There are a finite set of agents I = {1, 2, ..., I} with I ≥ 2; a finite set of possible states Θ;
and a set of pure alternatives A. We consider an environment with lotteries and transfers.
Specifically, we work with the space of allocations X ≡ ∆ (A)×RI where ∆(A) denotes the
set of lotteries on A that have a countable support and RI denotes the set of transfers to the
agents. Each θ ∈ Θ induces a preference relation θi over A for each agent i ∈ I. Thus, the
vector (θi)i∈I specifies every agent’s preference under θ. In what follows, we call θi agent i’s
type. Assume that Θ has no redundancy, i.e., θ 6= θ′ =⇒ θi 6= θ′i for some i. Hence, we can
identify a state θ with its induced type profile (θi)i∈I ; moreover, we say that a type profile
(θi)i∈I identifies a state θ
′ if θi = θ′i for every i ∈ I. We focus on complete information
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environments in which the state θ is common knowledge among the agents but unknown to
the designer.11
Let Θi be the set of types of agent i. We also assume that each θi ∈ Θi induces
a utility function ui (·, θi) : X → R which is quasilinear in transfers and has a bounded
expected utility representation on ∆ (A). That is, for each x =
(
l, (ti)i∈I
) ∈ X, we have
ui (x, θi) = vi(l, θi) + ti for some bounded expected utility function vi(l, θi) over ∆ (A). The
designer’s objective is specified by a social choice function (henceforth, SCF) f : Θ→ ∆ (A).
Finally, we define
D ≡ sup
i∈I,θi∈Θi,a,a′∈A
2× |ui(a, θi)− ui(a′, θi)|. (3)
3.2 Mechanism and Solution
A mechanismM is a triplet ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I where Mi is the nonempty finite set of messages
available to agent i; g : M → ∆(A) (M ≡ ×Ii=1Mi) is the outcome function; and τi : M → R
is the transfer rule which specifies the payment or subsidy to agent i. The environment and
the mechanism together constitute a game with complete information at each state θ ∈ Θ
which we denote by Γ(M, θ). A direct mechanism is a mechanism ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I where
Mi = Θ for every agent i and g (θ, ..., θ) = f (θ) for each θ.
Let σi ∈ ∆(Mi) be a (possibly mixed) strategy of agent i in the game Γ(M, θ). A strat-
egy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σI) ∈ ×i∈I∆(Mi) is said to be a (mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium
of the game Γ(M, θ) if, for any player i ∈ I, any messages mi ∈supp(σi) and m′i ∈ Mi, we
have ∑
m−i∈M−i
σ−i(m−i) {ui(g(mi,m−i); θi) + τi(mi,m−i)}
≥
∑
m−i∈M−i
σ−i(m−i) {ui(g(m′i,m−i); θi) + τi(m′i,m−i)} .
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium σ such that for each agent i, σi (mi) =
1 for some mi ∈Mi.
Let NE(Γ(M, θ)) denote the set of Nash equilibria of the game Γ(M, θ). We also
denote by supp (NE(Γ(M, θ))) as the set of message profiles that can be played with
11Thanks to the complete-information assumption, it is without loss of generality to assume that agents’
values are private. In Section 5.3, we also explain why it still entails no loss of generality even with information
perturbations around complete information.
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positive probability under some Nash equilibrium σ ∈ NE(Γ(M, θ), i.e.,
supp (NE(Γ(M, θ))) = {m ∈M : there exists σ ∈ NE(Γ(M, θ)) such that σ(m) > 0}
We propose our concept of Nash implementation.
Definition 1 An SCF f is implementable in Nash equilibria if there exists a mech-
anism M = ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I such that for any state θ ∈ Θ and m ∈ M , (i) there exists a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game Γ(M, θ); and (ii) m ∈ supp (NE(Γ(M, θ))) ⇒
g (m) = f (θ) and τi (m) = 0 for every i ∈ I.
Remark: We adopt Maskin’s (1999) definition of mixed-strategy Nash implementation.
Mezzetti and Renou (2012) propose another definition of Nash implementation that keeps
requirement (ii) but weaken requirement (i) in requiring only the existence of mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium. See Section 7.4 for more details.
3.3 Dictator Lottery
Recall that vi (·, θi) is the bounded expected utility function of agent i of type θi. We
maintain the following weak assumption throughout the paper:
Assumption 1 θi 6= θ′i ⇒ ui (·, θi) and ui (·, θ′i) induce different preference orders on X.
Given the assumption, we have the following result borrowed from Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992).
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, for each i ∈ I, there exists a function
yi : Θi → X such that for any θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 6= θ′i,
vi (yi (θi) , θi) > vi (yi (θ
′
i) , θi) . (4)
3.4 Maskin Monotonicity
For (θi, x) ∈ Θi ×X, we use Li (x, θi) to denote the lower-contour set at x in X for type θi,
i.e.,
Li (x, θi) = {x′ ∈ X : ui (x, θi) ≥ ui(x′, θi)} ,
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We use SU i (x, θi) to denote the strict upper-contour set of x ∈ X for type θi, i.e.,
SU i (x, θi) = {x′ ∈ X : ui(x′, θi) > ui(x, θi)} .
We now definition Maskin monotonicity which Maskin (1999) proposes for Nash implemen-
tation:
Definition 2 Say an SCF f satisfies Maskin monotonicity if, for any pair of states θ
and θ′ with f (θ) 6= f (θ′), there is some agent i ∈ I such that
Li (f (θ) , θi) ∩ SU i (f (θ) , θ′i) 6= ∅. (5)
The agent i in Definition 2 is called a “whistle-blower” or a “test agent” for the ordered pair
of states (θ, θ′).
To see the idea of Maskin monotonicity, suppose that f is implemented in Nash equi-
librium by a mechanism. When θ is the true state, there exists a Nash equilibrium m in
Γ(M, θ) which induces f (θ). If f (θ) 6= f (θ′), when θ′ becomes the true state, the strategy
profile m cannot be a Nash equilibrium, i.e., there exists some agent i who has a profitable
deviation. Suppose this deviation induces outcome x, i.e., agent i strictly prefers x to f (θ)
at state θ′. However, since m is a Nash equilibrium at state θ, such a deviation cannot
be profitable, and hence, agent i weakly prefers f (θ) to x at state θ. Therefore, Maskin
monotonicity is a necessary condition for Nash implementation.
Next, we introduce the notion of strict Maskin monotonicity defined in Bergemann
et al. (2011). For (θi, x) ∈ Θi ×X, we use SLi (x, θi) to denote the strict lower-contour set
at allocation x for type θi, i.e.,
SLi (x, θi) = {x′ ∈ X : ui(x, θi) > ui(x′, θi)} ,
Definition 3 Say an SCF f satisfies strict Maskin monotonicity if, for any pair of
states θ and θ′ with f (θ) 6= f (θ′), there is some agent i ∈ I such that
SLi (f (θ) , θi) ∩ SU i (f (θ) , θ′i) 6= ∅.
Observe that strict Maskin monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity in our trans-
ferable utility setup.
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3.5 Best Challenge Scheme
We now define a notion called the best challenge scheme, which plays a crucial role in prov-
ing our main results. Fix agent i of type θi. For each state θ˜ ∈ Θ, if SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩
SU i(f(θ˜), θi) 6= ∅, we select some x(θ˜, θi) ∈ SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩ SU i(f(θ˜), θi). Then, the best
challenge scheme for agent i of type θi is a function Bθi : Θ→ X such that for any θ˜ ∈ Θ,
Bθi(θ˜) =
 f(θ˜), if SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩ SU i(f(θ˜), θi) = ∅;x(θ˜, θi), if SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩ SU i(f(θ˜), θi) 6= ∅.
We may understand the notion of the best challenge scheme in conjuction with the
(strict) monotonicity of f . Indeed, if f (θ) 6= f
(
θ˜
)
, monotonicity of f requires that there
be a whistle-blower i together with a test allocation
x(θ˜, θi) ∈ SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩ SU i(f(θ˜), θi).
When the true state is θ and the designer is about to implement a misported social outcome
f
(
θ˜
)
, the whistle-blower can make use of the test allocation x(θ˜, θi) to convince the designer
that θ˜ is false and gain from blowing the whistle. The best challenge scheme saves the whistle-
blower from reporting the test allocation. As the scheme pre-selects the test allocations for
each state-type pair, the whistle-blower can just report the true state θ to challenge a bad
equilibrium misreport θ˜ to obtain the allocation x(θ˜, θi).
4 Pure-Strategy Nash Implementation
Recall that a mechanism is direct if every agent announces the preference profile of all agents
(i.e., a state) but nothing else. We prove our first result which shows that with three or more
agents, every Maskin-monotonic SCF can be implemented in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
by a direct mechanism. This is clearly at odds with the conventional wisdom that revelation
principle does not hold in the full Nash implementation problem, which is why all previous
papers resort to indirect mechanisms. Hence, Theorem 1 illustrates how monetary transfers
can be used to simplify the implementing mechanism to the largest extent and to dispense
with devices such as integer games or modulo games.
Reall that a direct mechanism is a mechanism ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I where Mi = Θ for every
agent i and g (θ, ..., θ) = f (θ) for each θ. We now state and prove the main result of the
section.
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Theorem 1 Suppose that there are at least three agents, i.e., I ≥ 3. Then, an SCF f is
implementable in pure-strategy Nash equilibria by a direct mechanism if and only if it satisfies
Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. Suppose that f satisfies Maskin-monotonicity. We define the implementing mecha-
nism according to three rules:
Rule 1. If there exists θ˜ such that mi = θ˜ for each i ∈ I, then g(m) = f(θ˜);
Rule 2. If there exist θ˜ and agent i ∈ I such that mj = θ˜ for all j 6= i and mi 6= θ˜, then
g(m) = Bθi(θ˜). Moreover, charge player i+ 1 (mod I) a large penalty 2η, where η > D and
D is as defined in (3).
Rule 3. Otherwise, g(m) = f(m1). Moreover, every agent i pays a penalty of η if and only
if arg maxθ˜ |{j ∈ I : mj = θ˜}| 6= {mi} (i.e., agent i does not report a state reported by the
unique majority).12
It follows from Rule 2 that if θ˜ is the true state, then Bθi(θ˜) 6= f
(
θ˜
)
implies that
Bθi(θ˜) ∈ SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i). Hence, everyone reporting the true state constitutes a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Now fix an arbitrary pure-strategy Nash equilibrium m. First, we claim that m cannot
trigger Rule 2. To see this, suppose that Rule 2 is triggered, and let agent i be the odd
man out. Then, agent i+ 1 finds it strictly profitable to deviate to announce mi: After such
a deviation, since I ≥ 3, either Rule 3 is triggered or it remains in Rule 2, but agent i is
no longer the odd man out. Thus, agent i + 1 saves at least η (from paying 2η to paying
η or 0). Such a deviation may also change the allocation selected by the outcome function
g (·), which induces utility change bounded by D. Since η > D, agent i + 1 strictly prefers
deviating to announce mi, which contradicts the hypothesis that m is a Nash equilibrium.
Second, we claim that m cannot trigger Rule 3 either. To see this, suppose that Rule
3 is triggered. Pick any state reported by some (not necessarily unique) majority of agents,
i.e., θˆ ∈ arg maxθ˜ |{j ∈ I : mj = θ˜}|. Let Iθˆ be the set of agents who report θˆ. Clearly,
Iθˆ ( I, because Rule 3 (rather than Rule 1) is triggered. Then, we can find an agent i∗ ∈ Iθˆ
such that agent i∗ + 1 (mod I) is not in Iθˆ. Since agent i
∗ + 1 does not belong to the
unique majority, he must pay η under m. Then, agent i∗ + 1 will strictly prefer deviating
to announce mi∗ = θˆ. Indeed, after such a deviation, either Rule 3 is triggered, and agent
12Hence, when there are multiple groups of majority, everyone has to pay η.
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i∗ + 1 falls in the unique majority who reports θˆ; or Rule 2 is triggered, but agent i∗ cannot
be the odd man out. Thus, agent i∗ + 1 saves at least η (from paying η to paying 0) and
η > D, the maximal utility change induced by different allocations in g (·). The existence of
profitable deviation of agent i∗+ 1 contradicts the hypothesis that m is a Nash equilibrium.
Hence, we conclude that m must trigger Rule 1. It follows that f(θ˜) = f (θ). Otherwise,
by Maskin monotonicity, a whistle blower can deviate to trigger Rule 2.
Remark: We adopt the notion of direct (revelation) mechanism from Dutta and Sen (1991)
and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Definition 179.2) but our notion differs from the one
adopted by Dasgupta et al. (1979) in which agents report only their own types/preferences.
In particular, Dasgupta et al. (1979, Theorem 7.1.1) shows that only strategy-proof SCFs are
“partially” implemented in Nash equilibrium by the notion of direct mechanism in Theorem
7.1.1 of Dasgupta et al. (1979).
Remark: Theorem 1 does not hold when there are only two agents. We provide a coun-
terexample in Appendix A.1.
We note that Benoˆıt and Ok (2008) also studies the exact Nash implementation problem
in economic environments. There are three major differences between Benoˆıt and Ok (2008)
and this paper, however. First, Benoˆıt and Ok (2008) consider a more general environment
in which either lotteries alone or transfers alone are allowed, while we need transfers in
proving Theorem 113 and both lotteries and transfers in proving Theorems 2 and 3. Second,
Benoˆıt and Ok (2008) prove that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition
for pure-strategy Nash implementation using the integer game device, whereas we prove the
result by using a direct mechanism. Third, Benoˆıt and Ok (2008) focus on pure-strategy
Nash implementation with three or more agents, while we fully characterize mixed-strategy
Nash implementation and rationalizable implementation in the following two sections.
5 Mixed-Strategy Nash Implementation
Theorem 1 establishes a revelation principle for Nash implementation. That is, in envi-
ronments with transfers, we need only direct mechanisms to fully implement any Maskin-
monotonic SCF in Nash equilibrium. The direct mechanism is a deterministic mechanism
13It is possible that lotteries exist in the direct mechanism when the definition of Maskin monotonicity
involves lotteries, otherwise we do not employ any randomization device in constructing the direct mechanism.
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and we completely ignores the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria. We now show that
by invoking both lotteries and transfers, we can implement any Maskin-monotonic SCF in
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in a finite mechanism. Its proof will be provided after we
propose a canonical mechanism to be used in the theorem below.
Theorem 2 An SCF f is implementable in Nash equilibria by a finite mechanism if and
only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity.
Jackson (1992, Example 4) constructs a monotonic SCF such that any finite mechanism
which implements the SCF in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium must also possess a mixed-
strategy equilibrium which Pareto-dominates the outcome associated with the pure-strategy
equilibria. The example shows that it is generally impossible to implement a monotonic
SCF in mixed-strategy equilibria in a finite mechanism without making use of lotteries and
transfers.
5.1 The Mechanism
We propose a mechanism M = (M, g, τ) that is used to prove Theorem 2. We define the
message space, allocation rule, and transfer rule as follows.
5.1.1 Message Space
A generic message of agent i is described as follows:
mi =
(
m1i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i
) ∈Mi = M1i ×M2i ×M3i = Θi ×Θ×Θi.
That is, agent i is asked to make (1) two announcements about his own type (i.e., m1i ,m
3
i );
and (2) an announcement about the state (i.e., m2i ). To simplify the notation, we write
m2i,j = θ˜j if agent i reports in m
2
i that agent j is of type θ˜j.
5.1.2 Allocation Rule
For each message profile m ∈M , the allocation is defined as follows:
g (m) =
1
I(I − 1)
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6=i
[
ei,j (mi,mj)
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ei,j (mi,mj))Bm3j
(
m2i
)]
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where yk : Θ→ X is the dictator lottery for agent k defined in Lemma 1 and
ei,j(mi,mj) =
 0, if m2i = m2j and Bm3j (m2i ) = f(m2i );ε, otherwise.
That is, the designer first chooses each pair of agents (i, j) with equal probability. A pair
of (i, j) will be treated differently from a pair of (j, i), i.e., the order of the pair matters in
determining the allocation. In what follows, say the second reports of agent i and agent j are
consistent if m2i = m
2
j ; moreover, say agent j does not challenge agent i if Bm3j (m
2
i ) = f(m
2
i ).
We distinguish two cases: (1) if the second reports of agent i and agent j are consistent and
agent j does not challenge agent i, then we implement f (m2i ); (2) if either the second reports
of agent i and agent j are inconsistent or agent j challenges agent i, then we implement the
compound lottery:
Cεi,j(m) ≡ ε×
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ε)×Bm3j
(
m2i
)
where yk (·) are the dictator lotteries defined in Lemma 1.
By strict Maskin monotonicity of the SCF f , for every m ∈ M , θ ∈ Θ and j ∈ I, we
can choose ε > 0 sufficiently small such that it does not disturb the monotonicity property,
i.e.,
uj(C
ε
i,j(m), θj) < uj(f(m
2
i ), θj) if Bm3j (m
2
i ) 6= f(m2i ) where m2i = θ; (6)
uj(C
ε
i,j(m), θj) > uj(f(m
2
i ), θj) if Bm3j (m
2
i ) 6= f(m2i ) where m3j = θj, (7)
That is, Cεi,j(m) ∈ SLj (f (m2i ) ,mj) ∩ SU j
(
f (m2i ) ,m
3
j
)
whenever Bm3j (m
2
i ) 6= f(m2i ), i.e.,
whenever it is an “effective” challenge, Cεi,j(m) is worse than f (m
2
i ) for agent j when agent
i tells the truth; Cεi,j(m) is better than f (m
2
i ) for agent j when agent i tells a lie.
5.1.3 Transfer Rule
We now define the transfer rule. For any message profile m ∈M and agent i ∈ I, we specify
the transfer to agent i as follows:
τi(m) =
∑
j 6=i
[
τ 1i,j(m) + τ
2
i,j(m)
]
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where
τ 1i,j (m) =

0, if m2i,j = m
2
j,j;
−η if m2i,j 6= m2j,j and m2i,j 6= m1j ;
η if m2i,j 6= m2j,j and m2i,j = m1j .
(8)
τ 2i,j (m) =
 0, if m2i,i = m2j,i;−η, if m2i,i 6= m2j,i, (9)
and
η > D. (10)
Recall that D is the maximal utility difference defined in (3). The transfer rule can be
summarized in the table below:
Transfer to agents m2i,j = m
2
j,j m
2
i,j 6= m2j,j
m2i,j = m
1
j or m
2
i,j 6= m1j m2i,j = m1j m2i,j 6= m1j(
τ 1i,j (m) , τ
2
j,i (m)
)
(0, 0) (η,−η) (−η,−η)
In words, for each pair of agents (i, j) to be chosen, they may incur the following transfers:
If their second reports on agent j’s type match, then they incur no transfer; if their second
reports on j’s type differ, then distinguish two subcases: (a) if agent i’s report matches agent
j’s first report, then agent j pays η to agent i; (b) if agent i’s report does not match agent
j’s first report either, then both agents pay η to the designer.
The mechanism has the following crucial feature which will be used in proving Theorem
2.
Claim 1 Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(M, θ). If m1i 6= θi for some mi ∈supp(σi),
then we must have ek,j (mk,mj) = ej,k (mj,mk) = 0 for every mj ∈supp(σj) and every agent
j 6= k.
Proof. Observe that m1i only affects agent i’s own payoff through controlling the dictator
lottery yi. Hence, if ei,j (mi,mj) = ε or ej,i (mj,mi) = ε, then m
1
i = θi by (4).
Note ei,j (mi,mj) = ε (and similarly for ej,i (mj,mi) = ε) when m
2
i 6= m2j or Bm3j (m2i ) 6=
f(m2i ). Hence, the claim says that agent i must report his true type in m
1
i in any of his
equilibrium message(s) whenever he believes that (mi,m−i) will be inconsistent or result in
challenge for some agents j, k.
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5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We first note that Maskin monotonicity is already shown to be a necessary condition. Thus,
we focus on the “if” part of the proof. Consider an arbitrary true state θ = (θi)i∈I .
First, we argue that truth-telling m where mi = (θi, θ, θi) for each i ∈ I constitutes a
pure-strategy equilibrium. Under the message profile m, for any i, j ∈ I, we have Bm3j (m2i ) =
f(θ) and ei,j(mi,mj) = 0. Firstly, reporting m˜i with either m˜
2
i,i 6= θi or m˜2i,j 6= θj suffers the
penalty of η > D and hence cannot be a profitable deviation. Secondly, reporting m˜i with
m˜2i = θ and m˜
3
i 6= θi either leads to Bm˜3i (θ) = f(θ) and results in no change in payoff or
Bm˜3i (θ) 6= f(θ) which is strictly worse than f(θ) by (6). Finally, reporting m˜i with m˜2i = θ,
m˜3i = θi, and m˜
1
i 6= θi does not affect the allocation or transfer, since we still have τi (m) = 0
and ej,k(mj,mk) = 0 for every j and k.
Second, we show that for any Nash equilibrium σ of the game Γ(M, θ) and any
m ∈supp(σ), g (m) = f (θ) and τi (m) = 0 for any i ∈ I. The proof is divided into
three steps: (Step 1) contagion of truth: if agent j announces his type truthfully in his first
report, then every agent must also report agent j’s type truthfully in their second report;
(Step 2) consistency : every agent reports the same state θ˜ in the second report; and (Step
3) no challenge: no agent challenges the common reported state θ˜, i.e., Bm3j (θ˜) = f(θ˜) for
any j ∈ I. Consistency implies that τi (m) = 0 for any i ∈ I, whereas no challenge together
with monotonicity of f implies that g (m) = f(θ˜) = f (θ). We now proceed to establish the
three steps.
5.2.1 Contagion of Truth
Claim 2 We establish two results:
(a) If agent j reports the truth in his first report with probability one (i.e., m1j = θj for any
mj ∈supp(σj)), then every agent i 6= j must report agent j’s type truthfully in his second
report with probability one (i.e., m2i,j = θj for any mi ∈supp(σi)).
(b) If every agent i reports a fixed type θ˜j of agent j in his second report with probability one
(i.e., m2i,j = θ˜j for any mi ∈supp(σi)), then agent j must report θ˜j in his second report with
probability one (i.e., m2j,j = θ˜j for any mj ∈supp(σj)).
Proof. We first prove (a). Suppose instead that there exists some mi ∈supp(σi) such that
m2i,j 6= θj. Let m˜i be a message that is identical to mi except that m˜2i,j = θj. Consider
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any m−i ∈supp(σ−i) and distinguish two cases: If m2j,j = θj, due to the construction of
τ 1i,j(·), we have τ 1i,j (m) = −η whereas τ 1i,j (m˜i,m−i) = 0. If m2j,j 6= θj, then according to the
construction of τ 1i,j (·) , we have τ 1i,j (mi,m−i) is either 0 or −η whereas τ 1i,j (m˜i,m−i) = η.
Thus, in terms of transfers, the gain from reporting m˜i rather than mi is at least η; while,
in terms of allocation, the potential loss is at most D. Since η > D by (10), m˜i is a better
response than mi against any m−i ∈ supp(σ−i). This is a contradiction to the hypothesis
that mi ∈ supp(σi). This concludes (a).
We then prove (b). Suppose on the contrary that there exists mj ∈ supp(σj) such that
m2j,j 6= θ˜j. We then construct m˜j as a message that is identical to mj except that m˜2j,j = θ˜j.
According to the construction of τ 2j,i (·) and because η > D by (10), we conclude that m˜j is
a better response than mj against any m−j ∈ supp(σ−j). This contradicts the hypothesis
that mj ∈ supp(σj). This concludes (b).
5.2.2 Consistency
Claim 3 Everyone announces the same state in their second report. That is, there exists a
state θ˜ such that, for any agent i ∈ I and mi ∈ supp(σi), we have m2i = θ˜.
Proof. We prove consistency in the following three cases:
Case 1: Everyone tells the truth in the first report with probability one, i.e., m1i = θi for
every mi ∈supp(σi) and every agent i ∈ I.
It follows directly from Claim 2 that m2i = θ for every mi ∈supp(σi) and every agent
i ∈ I.
Case 2: Two or more agents tell a lie in their first report with positive probability, i.e.,
m1i 6= θi and m1j 6= θj for some mi ∈supp(σi) and mj ∈supp(σj).
Since m1i 6= θi, it follows from Claim 1 that ei,k (mi,mk) = 0 for every mk ∈supp(σk)
and every agent k. Hence,(mi,m−i) is consistent for every m−i ∈supp(σ−i). Similarly,
(mj,m−j) is consistent for every m−j ∈supp(σ−j). Hence, everyone reports the same state
in the second report.
Case 3: Only one agent, say agent i, tells a lie in the first report with positive probability
(i.e., m1i 6= θi for some mi ∈supp(σi)) and for every agent j 6= i, we have m1j = θj for every
mj ∈supp(σj).
First, since m1j = θj for every mj ∈supp(σj), it follows from Claim 2(a) that for every
agent j 6= i, we must have m2k,j = θj for every k 6= j and mk ∈supp(σk). Second, since
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m1i 6= θi, by Claim 1, (mi,m−i) is consistent for every m−i ∈supp(σ−i). In particular, every
agent j 6= i must report a common θ˜i = m2i,i with probability one. It thus follows from
Claim 2(b) that m˜2i = θ˜i for every m˜i ∈supp(σi). Hence, m˜2k = (θ˜i, θ−i) for every agent
mk ∈supp(σk) and every agent k ∈ I.
5.2.3 No challenge
Claim 4 No one challenges the common state θ˜ announced in the second report, i.e., Bm3j (θ˜) =
f(θ˜) for every mj ∈suppσj and for every agent j ∈ I.
Proof. By Claim 3, denote by θ˜ the common state announced in the second report. Suppose
that SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j) ∩ SUj(f(θ˜), θj) = ∅ for every agent j. Then, if Bm3j (θ˜) 6= f(θ˜), then
Bm3j (θ˜) ∈ SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j) must be strictly worse than f(θ˜) under the true type of agent j.14
Then, if m3j triggers a challenge and hence the allocation Bm3j (θ˜), agent j can profitably
deviate from announcing mj to annoucing m˜j =
(
m1j ,m
2
j , θ˜i
)
. Hence, Bm3j (θ˜) = f(θ˜) and
hence the claim holds.
It remains to show that SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j) ∩ SUj(f(θ˜), θj) = ∅. Suppose to the contrary
that SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j) ∩ SUj(f(θ˜), θj) 6= ∅. Then, we must have Bm3j (θ˜) 6= f(θ˜) for every
mj ∈supp(σj). Indeed, if Bm3j (θ˜) = f(θ˜), agent j can profitably deviate from announcing mj
to announcing m˜j =
(
m1j ,m
2
j , θi
)
. This deviation results in the better allocation Bm˜3j (θ˜) ∈
SUj(f(θ˜), θj). Finally, since Bm3j (θ˜) 6= f(θ˜) for every mj ∈supp(σj), it follows that the
dictator lottery is triggered with positive probability. Thus, by (4), each agent i has strict
incentive to announce the true type in his first report, i.e., m1i = θi for each mi ∈suppσi and
agent i ∈ I. By Claim 2, we conclude that θ˜ = θ and hence SLj(f(θ), θj)∩Uj(f(θ), θj) 6= ∅,
which is impossible.
5.3 Robustness to Information Perturbations
Chung and Ely (2003) and Aghion et al. (2012) consider a designer who not only wants all
equilibria of her mechanism to yield a desirable outcome under complete information, but is
also concerned about the possibility that agents may entertain small doubts about the true
14Since SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j) ∩ SUj(f(θ˜), θj) = ∅, we must have uj
(
Bm3j (θ˜), θj
)
≤ uj
(
f(θ˜), θj
)
. If
uj
(
Bm3j (θ˜), θj
)
= uj
(
f(θ˜), θj
)
, then adding small transfer to agent j in Bm3j (θ˜) will make Bm3j (θ˜) ∈
SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j) ∩ SUj(f(θ˜), θj). This is a contradiction to SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j) ∩ SUj(f(θ˜), θj) = ∅.
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state. They argue that such a designer should insist on implementing the SCF in the closure
of a solution concept as incomplete information about the state vanishes. Chung and Ely
(2003) adopt undominated Nash equilibrium and Aghion et al. (2012) adopt subgame-perfect
equilibrium as a solution concept in studying the robustness issue.
To allow for information perturbations, we now dispense with the private-value assump-
tion. Suppose that each state θ associates for each agent i a utility function ui (·, θ) : X → R
which is quasilinear in transfers and has a bounded expected utility representation on ∆ (A).
Indeed, while the private-value assumption entails no loss of generality under complete in-
formation, it need not be the case once we relax the complete-information assumption.
Formally, suppose that the agents do not observe the state directly but are informed
of the state via signals. The set of agent i’s signals is denoted as Si which is identified with
Θ, i.e., Si ≡ Θ.15 A signal profile is an element s = (s1, ..., sI) ∈ S ≡ ×i∈ISi. When the
realized signal profile is s, agent i observes only his own signal si. Let s
θ
i be the signal in
which agent i’s signal is θ and write sθ =
(
sθi
)
i∈I . State and signals are drawn from some
prior distribution over Θ×S. In particular, complete information can be modeled as a prior
µ such that µ (θ, s) = 0 whenever s 6= sθ. Such µ will be called a complete-information prior.
We assume for each i ∈ I, the marginal distribution on i’s signals places strictly positive
weight on each of i’s signals in every state, that is, margSiµ (si) > 0 for every si ∈ Si, so
that Bayes’s rule is well defined. For any prior ν, we also write ν (·|si) for the conditional
distribution of ν on signal si.
The distance between two priors is measured by the supremum metric. That is, for any
two priors µ and ν, d (µ, ν) ≡ max(θ,s)∈Θ×S |µ (θ, s)− ν (θ, s)| . Write νε → µ if d (νε, µ)→ 0
as ε→ 0. A prior ν together with a mechanismM induces an incomplete-information game
which we denote as Γ (M, ν). A (mixed-)strategy of agent i is now a mapping σi : Si →
∆ (Mi). Note that here NE (M, ν) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We recap the standard
notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in the current setup:
Definition 4 A strategy profile σ constitute a (mixed-strategy) Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium (BNE) in Γ (M, ν) if and only if for any agent i with signal si and for any messages
15We adopt this formulation from Chung and Ely (2003) and Aghion et al. (2012). Our result holds for
any alternative formulation so long as the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium correspondence has closed graph.
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mi ∈supp(σi (si)) and m′i ∈Mi, we have∑
θ,s−i
ν (θ, s−i|si)
∑
m−i
σ−i (s−i) [m−i] [ui(g(mi,m−i), θ) + τi(m′i,m−i)]
≥
∑
θ,s−i
ν (θ, s−i|si)
∑
m−i
σ−i (s−i) [m−i] [ui(g(m′i,m−i), θ) + τi(m
′
i,m−i)] .
More generally, the designer may subscribe a solution concept E for the game Γ (M, ν)
(such as BNE) which induces a set of mappings (which we call acts following Chung and
Ely (2003)) from Θ × S to X. Denote the set of acts induced by the solution concept E as
E (M, ν). We now define E-implementable as follows.
Definition 5 An SCF f is E-implementable under the complete-information prior µ if there
exists a mechanismM = ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I such that for any θ ∈ Θ and any sequence of priors
{νn} converging to µ, the following two requirements hold: (i) there is a sequence of acts
{αn} with αn ∈ E (M, νn) such that αn (θ, s) → f(θ); (ii) for every sequence of acts {αn}
with αn ∈ E (M, νn), we have αn (θ, s)→ f(θ).
Chung and Ely (2003) and Aghion et al. (2012) show that Maskin monotonicity is
a necessary condition for UNE-implementation and SPE-implementation, respectively.16
The result of Chung and Ely (2003) implies that implementation of a non-monotonic SCF
in undominated Nash equilibrium such as the result in Abreu and Matsushima (1994) is
necessarily vulnerable to information perturbations. Moreover, both Chung and Ely (2003,
Theorem 2) and Aghion et al. (2012) establish the sufficiency result by restricting attention
to pure-strategy equilibrium and by using infinite mechanisms. This raises the question as to
whether their robustness test may be too demanding when it is applied to finite mechanisms
such as the implementing mechanism of Jackson et al. (1994), that of Abreu and Matsushima
(1994), or a simple mechanism in Section 5 of Moore and Repullo (1988) where mixed-
strategy equilibria have to be taken seriously.
The canonical mechanism which we propose in the proof of Theorem 2 is indeed finite,
and we show that the finite mechanism implements any Maskin-monotonic SCF in mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium. Since NE (M, ν) viewed as a correspondence on priors, has a
closed graph, it follows that the mechanism achieves NE-implementation. Note that this
16Aghion et al. (2012) adopt sequential equilibrium as the solution concept for the incomplete-information
game Γ (M, ν).
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closed-graph property holds even when we allow for interdependent values. Hence, if a
solution concept E refines Nash equilibrium, then (ii) implies (i) in Definition 5. We now
obtain the following result as a corollary of Theorem 2.
Proposition 1 Let E be a solution concept such that ∅ 6= E (M, ν) ⊂ NE (M, ν) for each
finite mechanismM and prior ν. Then, every Maskin-monotonic SCF f is E-implementable.
The condition ∅ 6= E (M, ν) ⊂ NE (M, ν) is satisfied for virtually any refinement of
Nash equilibrium, because we allow for mixed-strategy equilibrium and the requirement is
imposed only for finite mechanisms.
6 Rationalizable Implementation
In this section, we adopt the solution concept of correlated rationalizability of Brandenburger
and Dekel (1987), allowing the agents’ beliefs to be correlated, and investigate the implica-
tions of implementation in rationalizable strategies. Our goal is to show that by modifying
the finite implementing mechanism used in our Theorem 2, we can also implement the largest
possible class of SCFs in rationalizable strategies.
First, we define rationalizability for the finite game Γ (M, θ) as follows. Let S0i (M, θ) =
Mi, and we define S
k
i (M, θ) inductively: for any k > 0, we set
Ski (M, θ) =
mi ∈Mi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
there exists λi ∈ ∆ (M−i) such that
(1) λi (m−i) > 0⇒ mj ∈ Sk−1j (M, θ) for each j 6= i,
(2) mi ∈ arg maxmi λi (m−i)ui (g (mi,m−i) , θi) .
 .
Then, S∞i (M, θ) =
⋂∞
k=0 S
k
i (M, θ) is the set of rationalizable messages of agent i and
S∞ (M, θ) = ∏i∈I S∞i (M, θ) is the set of rationalizable message profiles in Γ (M, θ).
Throughout this section, we impose a technical assumption that Θ has a product
structure, i.e., Θ =
∏
i∈I Θi, which is due to the fact that rationalizable strategy profiles
have a product structure, i.e., S∞ (M, θ) = ∏i∈I S∞i (M, θ).
Definition 6 An SCF f is implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists
a mechanism M = ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I such that for any θ ∈ Θ, (i) S∞(M, θ) 6= ∅; and (ii)
for any m ∈ S∞(M, θ), we have g (m) = f (θ) and τi (m) = 0.
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Remark: Since we propose a finite implementing mechanism below, S∞ (M, θ) is always
nonempty. That is, requirement (i) of rationalizable implementation is automatically satis-
fied.
Second, we introduce a central condition to our rationalizable implementation result,
which is called Maskin monotonicity∗. The condition is proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011)
as a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation using “well-behaved” mechanisms
(such as finite one). However, Bergemann et al. (2011) has left open the question as to
when an SCF is implementable in rationalizable strategies in a “well-behaved” mechanism.
Theorem 3 fills the gap in the environment with lotteries and transfers.
For (θi, x) ∈ Θi × X, recall that SLi (x, θi) denotes the strict lower-contour set at
allocation x for type θi. Given an SCF f , we let Pf = {Θz}z∈f(Θ) be the partition on Θ
induced by f where Θz = {θ ∈ Θ| f(θ) = z}. For each partition P on Θ, we denote by P (θ)
the atom in P which contains state θ. Define
Li (x,P (θ)) ≡
⋂
θˆ∈P(θ)
Li(x, θˆi) and SLi (x,P (θ)) ≡
⋂
θˆ∈P(θ)
SLi(x, θˆi)
The following definition is obtained by adapting Definition 5 of Bergemann et al. (2011)
to our current setup.
Definition 7 Say an SCF f satisfies Maskin monotonicity∗ if there exists a partition
P of Θ such that (i) P is weakly finer than Pf ; (ii) for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, whenever θ′ 6∈ P (θ),
there exists i ∈ I for whom
Li (f(θ),P (θ)) ∩ SU i(f(θ), θ′i) 6= ∅. (11)
As we introduce strict Maskin monotonicity, we say that an SCF f satisfies strict
Maskin monotonicity∗ if we replace Li (f(θ),P (θ)) in (11) with SLi (f(θ),P (θ)). Again, in
the environment with transfers, strict Maskin monotonicity∗ and Maskin monotonicity∗ are
equivalent.
Remark: Clearly, Maskin monotonicity∗ implies Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, Jain
(2017, Appendix 2) constructs an example to show that strict Maskin monotonicity∗ is
strictly stronger than strict Maskin monotonicity. In Appendix A.2, we modify Jain’s ex-
ample to make the same point in our setup, which accommodates the case with two agents
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and lotteries and transfers. Since (strict) Maskin monotonicity∗ is a necessary condition for
rationalizable implementation by a finite mechanism, we conclude that rationalizable imple-
mentation is generally more restrictive than Nash implementation.
Let P be the partition in the definition of strict Maskin monotonicity∗. As the case
of Nash implementation, we also make use of the best challenge scheme with respect to P .
Fix agent i of type θi. For each state θ˜ ∈ Θ, if SLi(f(θ˜),P(θ)) ∩ SU i(f(θ˜), θi) 6= ∅ , we
select some x(θ˜, θi) ∈ SLi(f(θ˜),P(θ)) ∩ SU i(f(θ˜), θi). The best challenge scheme for agent
i of type θi with respect to P is defined as a function Bθi : Θ→ X such that for any θ˜ ∈ Θ,
Bθi(θ˜) =
 f(θ˜), if SLi(f(θ˜),P(θ˜)) ∩ SU i(f(θ˜), θi) = ∅;x(θ˜, θi), if SLi(f(θ˜),P(θ˜)) ∩ SU i(f(θ˜), θi) 6= ∅
where we omit the reference to P in Bθi for simplicity.
We now state our main result on rationalizable implementation as follows.
Theorem 3 An SCF f is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism
if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity∗.
Since a finite mechanism satisfies the best response property defined in Bergemann et al.
(2011, Definition 6), the “only if” part of Theorem 3 follows from Proposition 3 of Bergemann
et al. (2011). In the following subsections, we will construct a mechanism to prove the “if”
part of Theorem 3.
6.1 The Mechanism
Let Γi denote the set of functions from Θ to Θi. Observe that Γi is a finite set because both
Θ and Θi are finite. Call each γi a challenge function of agent i which is viewed as a plan
to challenge contingent on the state realization.
6.1.1 Message Space
A generic message of agent i is:
mi =
(
m1i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ,m
4
i
) ∈M1i ×M2i ×M3i ×M4i = Mi = Θi ×Θ×Θ× Γi.
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That is, in this mechanism, agent i is asked to make (1) an announcement of his own type
(i.e., m1i ); (2) two announcements of the state (i.e., m
2
i , and m
3
i ); (3) an announcement of a
challenge function (i.e., m4i ).
6.1.2 Allocation Rule
Say two states θ and θ′ are equivalent (denoted as θ ∼ θ′) if they belong to the same atom
of P . Given a message profile m, we say that m is consistent if there exists θ˜ ∈ Θ such that
m1 identifies θ˜ and m2i ∼ m3i ∼ θ˜ for every i ∈ I.
That is, consistency requires that the type profile m1 identify a state θ˜ that is equivalent to
each of the two states (i.e., m2i and m
3
i ) reported by every agent. Alternatively, we also say
that m is consistent on θ˜.
For each message profile m ∈M , the allocation is defined as follows:
g (m) =
1
I2
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
[
ei,j (mi,mj)
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ei,j (mi,mj))Bm4j(m3i )
(
m3i
)]
where yk : Θ→ X is the dictator lottery for agent k defined in Lemma 1 and
ei,j (mi,mj) =
 0, if mi is consistent with mj and Bm4j(m3i ) (m3i ) = f(m3i );ε, otherwise.
Note that there are two differences from the allocation rule from Nash implementation: (1)
here we allow any pair of (i, j), even including the case of i = j, to be chosen with positive
probability; (2) the best challenge scheme we use is a challenge scheme contingent on every
possible state.
6.1.3 Transfer Rule
We now define the transfer rule. For any message profile m ∈M and agent i ∈ I, we specify
the transfer from agent i as follows:
τi(m) = τ
2
i (m) + τ
3
i (m),
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where
τ 2i (m) =
 0, if m1 identifies θ˜ and m2i ∼ θ˜;η′′, otherwise.
τ 3i (m) =
 0η if m
3
i ∼ m2i+1;
otherwise.
In words, τ 2i (m) and τ
3
i (m) are the cross-checking penalties which ensure that once the type
profile m1 identifies a unique state θ˜, each agent i will only want to announce states which
are equivalent to θ˜ when reporting m2i and m
3
i . Specifically, τ
2
i (m) requires that agent i pay
η′′ if his announcement m2i is “not” equivalent to the state identified by m
1; τ 3i (m) requires
that agent i pay η if his announcement m3i is not equivalent to agent (i+ 1)’s announcement
m2i+1 where I + 1 ≡ 1.
By strict Maskin monotonicity∗ of the SCF f , for every m ∈ M , θ ∈ Θ and j ∈ I, we
can choose ε > 0 sufficiently small such that
uj(C
ε
i,j(m), θj) > uj(f(m
3
i ), θj), if Bm4j (m3i )(m
3
i ) 6= f(m3i ) and m4j(m3i ) = θj; (12)
uj(C
ε
i,j(m), θj) < uj(f(m
3
i ), θj), if Bm4j (m3i )(m
3
i ) 6= f(m3i ) and m3i = θ (13)
where
Cεi,j(m) ≡ ε×
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ε)×Bm4j(m3i )
(
m3i
)
That is, Cεi,j(m) ∈ SLj (f (m3i ) , θj)∩SU j
(
f (m3i ) ,m
4
j (m
3
i )
)
whenever Bm4j (m3i )(m
3
i ) 6= f(m3i )
and m3i = θ.
Once again, since Θ is finite, we can find d > 0 such that for any i ∈ I and θi, θ′i ∈ Θi
with θi 6= θ′i, the dictator lotteries satisfy
ui (yi (θi) , θi) > ui (yi (θ
′
i) , θi) + d. (14)
Finally, we choose η′′ > 0 small enough and η > 0 large enough such that
ε
I3
d > η′′; (15)
η > D. (16)
We relegate the proof of Theorem 3 to Appendix A.3. Here we give only an outline of
the proof and highlight its difference from the proof of Theorem 2. In this proof, we start by
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arguing that if m is rationalizable, then m1 identifies a state which is equivalent to the true
state. Next, the cross-checking transfers τ 2i and τ
3
i ensure that each m
2
i and m
3
i also identify
a state equivalent to the true state.
Unlike the mechanism we constructed for Nash implementation, we check the coherence
between the first and second reports of the same agent. Specifically, whether agent i needs to
pay η′′ depends on both his own first and his own second reports. Recall that agent i’s first
report does not affect his own transfer in our proof of Nash implementation. In contrast, such
self-checking is crucial for the mechanism to achieve rationalizable implementation. Indeed,
here we can argue only that m1 identifies a state which is equivalent to the true state. If we
only cross-check each agent’s announcement of the other agents’ types (instead of all agents’)
in the second report (as τ 1i,j does for Nash implementation), then the state identified by the
second report may no longer be equivalent to the true state.17 Clearly, the self-checking may
interfere with the truth-telling incentive in m1i , and hence we add condition (15) to make
sure that η′′ is not too large. As a result, we cannot have m2i control the allocation but
only use m2i to “preserve” the truth identified by m
1. This explains why we need two state
announcements instead of one, as in Nash implementation.
The lack of correct belief in rationalizability necessitates that agent i has an opportunity
to challenge his own state announcement. Otherwise, agent i may report a state that is
outside the equivalence class of the true state if he believes that the lie will not be challenged
by any other agent.
6.2 Continuous Implementation
Oury and Tercieux (2012) consider the following notion of robustness for partial implemen-
tation: the designer wants not only that there be an equilibrium that implements the SCF
but also that the same equilibrium continue to implement the SCF in all the models close to
17To see this, consider an example with two agents, each of whom has two types. Consider an SCF:
f (θ1, θ2) = f (θ
′
1, θ
′
2) = a and f (θ
′
1, θ2) = f (θ1, θ
′
2) = b. Let P = {{(θ1, θ2) , (θ′1, θ′2)}, {(θ′1, θ2) , (θ1, θ′2)}} be
a partition over Θ. Suppose that m1 identifies the atom which contains the true state (θ1, θ2). If agent 1
is asked to announce only agent 2’s types in his second report, agent 1 may well announce θ2 or θ
′
2 since
the “true atom” contains both (θ1, θ2) and (θ
′
1, θ
′
2). However, the same situation occurs when the true state
is (θ′1, θ
′
2). In other words, we cannot preserve the “true atom” identified by m
1 without cross-checking the
entire type profile.
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her initial model. Hence, the SCF is continuously implementable. Oury and Tercieux (2012)
obtain the following characterization of continuous implementation in their Theorem 4: an
SCF is continuously implementable by a finite mechanism if it is exactly implementable in
rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism.18 Since this result says nothing about the
class of SCFs that are exactly implementable in rationalizable strategies by finite mecha-
nisms, we view this as an important open question in the literature.19 We establish the
following continuous implementation result, which is a direct consequence of our Theorem 3
and Theorem 4 of Oury and Tercieux (2012).
Proposition 2 If an SCF satisfies Maskin monotonicity∗, it is continuously implementable
by a finite mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, Proposition 2 is the first to delineate the class of SCFs
which are continuously implementable. The condition identified is Maskin monotonicity∗,
which is stronger than Maskin monotonicity itself. Recall the example in Appendix A.2 which
shows that strict Maskin monotonicity∗ is strictly stronger than strict Maskin monotonicity.
There are two caveats in relating Proposition 2 to Theorem 4 of Oury and Tercieux (2012).
The first caveat is that we focus on complete-information environments, whereas Oury and
Tercieux (2012) deal with incomplete-information environments in which the baseline model
can be an arbitrary finite type space. The second caveat is that we specialize in environments
with lottery and transfer, whereas Oury and Tercieux (2012) impose no restriction on the
environment. Oury and Tercieux (2012) also allow for any degree of interdependence of
preferences.
6.3 Responsive SCFs
Bergemann et al. (2011) introduce a condition on SCFs.
18In fact, assuming that sending messages is slightly costly, Oury and Tercieux (2012) also prove the con-
verse: an SCF is continuously implementable by a finite mechanism only if it is rationalizably implementable
by a finite mechanism.
19In particular, in their study of exact rationalizable implementation, Bergemann et al. (2011) invoke
an infinite mechanism with integer games to implement strict Maskin-monotonic∗ SCFs. Hence, it is not
possible to combine Theorem 4 of Oury and Tercieux (2012) with the result of Bergemann et al. (2011) to
get a possibility result for continuous implementation.
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Definition 8 An SCF f is responsive if, for any pair of states θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ, f(θ) = f(θ′)⇒
θ = θ′.
Responsiveness requires that the SCF “responds” to a change in the state with a
change in the social choice outcome. Observe that a responsive SCF that satisfies Maskin
monotonicity must satisfy Maskin monotonicity∗. Indeed, since Pf is the finest partition on
Θ, θ
′
/∈ P(θ) if and only if θ′ 6= θ. We thus obtain the following corollary for the case of
responsive SCFs.
Corollary 1 Let f be a responsive SCF. Then, the SCF f is implementable in rationalizable
strategies by a finite mechanism if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity.
Remark: Bergemann et al. (2011) prove that under the no-worst alternative condition
(see Definition 4 of Bergemann et al. (2011)), if there are at least three agents, and f is
responsive and satisfies strict Maskin monotonicity, then f is implementable in rationalizable
strategies by an infinite mechanism. In contrast, with use of lotteries and transfer, we achieve
rationalizable implementation by a finite mechanism and we can handle the case of two
agents.
In what follows, we argue that the responsiveness of SCFs is tightly connected to the
permissive result of virtual implementation by Abreu and Matsushima (1992), who show that
when there are at least three agents, any SCF is virtually implementable in rationalizable
strategies by a finite mechanism. An SCF f is said to be virtually implementable if, for any
ε ∈ (0, 1), the SCF f is exactly implementable with probability 1 − ε. Fix an SCF f . For
each ε ∈ (0, 1), define f ε : Θ→ ∆(A) as follows: for any θ ∈ Θ,
f ε(θ) =
ε
I
∑
i∈I
yi(θi) + (1− ε)f(θ),
where yi(θi) is the dictator lottery for type θi, as constructed in Lemma 1. Moreover,
by adding small transfers to the dictator lotteries, we can make
∑
i∈I yi(θi) 6=
∑
i∈I yi(θ
′
i)
whenever θ 6= θ′, without affecting the conclusion of Lemma 1 (i.e., (17) below). Therefore,
f ε(θ) 6= f ε(θ′) whenever θ 6= θ′. In other words, we can make f ε responsive. We now
argue that f ε is also Maskin-monotonic.20 Fix two states θ and θ′ with θ 6= θ′ (and hence
20One additional property Abreu and Matsushima (1992) obtain in their mechanism is that they can make
the size of transfers arbitrarily small. We discuss this below.
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f ε(θ) 6= f ε(θ′)). Since θ 6= θ′ and due to the construction of dictator lotteries, there must
exist agent i for whom
ui(yi(θi), θi) > ui(yi(θ
′
i), θi) and ui(yi(θ
′
i), θ
′
i) > ui(yi(θi), θ
′
i). (17)
We construct the following lottery x(θ, θ′i) ∈ X:
x(θ, θ′i) ≡
ε
I
(
yi(θ
′
i) +
∑
j 6=i
yj(θj)
)
+ (1− ε)f(θ).
That is, x(θ, θ′i) is constructed by replacing yi(θi) in f (θ) with yi(θ
′
i). By (17), we have
x(θ, θ′i) ∈ SLi (f (θ) , θi) ∩ SU i (f (θ) , θ′i) .
This shows that f ε satisfies strict Maskin monotonicity. By Theorem 3, we provide the
following result without proof.
Corollary 2 Any SCF f is virtually implementable in rationalizable strategies by a finite
mechanism.
Recall that our mechanism is different from that of Abreu and Matsushima (1992), who
do not use transfers but rather introduce a domain restriction in the lottery space. AM’s
(1992) domain restriction requires that for every player i and state θ, there exist a pair of
lotteries which are strictly ranked for player i and for which other players have the (weakly)
opposite ranking. Since we can choose the size of transfers to be as small as possible using
the technique developed by AM (see also Section 7.2), we obtain the following result:
Corollary 3 Any SCF f is virtually implementable in rationalizable strategies with arbi-
trarily small transfer by a finite mechanism.
7 Extensions
We now establish several extensions of our Nash implementation results. In Section 7.1, we
extend our result to the case of social choice correspondences. Section 7.2 shows that one
can make the size of transfers arbitrarily small in our implementation results. In Section 7.3,
we extend our results to an infinite state space model. Finally, by making use of the infinite
state space extension in Section 7.3, we handle the ordinal approach to Nash implementation
in Section 7.4. The proofs of Sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 are relegated to the Appendix.
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7.1 Social Choice Correspondences
Many papers in the literature on Nash implementation deal with social choice correspon-
dences, i.e., multivalued social choice rules. In this section, we extend our Nash implemen-
tation result to the case of social choice correspondences (henceforth, SCCs). The designer’s
objective is now specified by an SCC F : Θ⇒ ∆ (A). We first extend Maskin monotonicity
to the case of SCCs.
Definition 9 Say an SCC F satisfies Maskin monotonicity if, for any pair of states θ
and θ′ and l ∈ F (θ) \F (θ′), there is some agent i ∈ I such that
Li (l, θi) ∩ SU i (l, θ′i) 6= ∅.
Similarly, we extend strict Maskin monotonicity to the case of SCCs. We say that
an SCC F satisfies strict Maskin monotonicity, if for any pair of states θ and θ
′
and l ∈
F (θ)\F (θ′), there is some agent i ∈ I such that SLi(l, θi) ∩ SU i(l, θ′i) 6= ∅. As in the case
of SCF, in our transferable utility setup, strict Maskin monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin
monotonicity for the case of SCCs.
We extend the best challenge scheme to the case of SCCs. Fix agent i of type θi. For
each state θ˜ ∈ Θ, and x ∈ F (θ˜), if SLi(l, θ˜i) ∩ SU i(l, θi) 6= ∅, we select some x(l, θ˜, θi) ∈
SLi(l, θ˜i) ∩ SU i(l, θi). Then, the best challenge scheme for agent i of type θi is defined as a
function Bθi such that for any θ˜ ∈ Θ and l ∈ F (θ˜),
Bθi(θ˜, l) =
 l, if SLi(l, θ˜i) ∩ SU i(l, θi) = ∅;x(l, θ˜, θi), if SLi(l, θ˜i) ∩ SU i(l, θi) 6= ∅.
We propose the concept of Nash implementation for the case of SCCs.
Definition 10 An SCC F is implementable in Nash equilibria if there exists a mech-
anism M = ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I such that for any state θ ∈ Θ, the following two condi-
tions are satisfied: (i) for any l ∈ F (θ), there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
m ∈ Γ(M, θ) such that g(m) = l and τi(m) = 0 for every i ∈ I; and (ii) for every
m ∈ supp (NE(Γ(M, θ))), we have supp(g(m)) ⊂ F (θ) and τi (m) = 0 for every i ∈ I.
Remark: This definition is the same as that of Maskin (1999). The definition of Nash
implementation proposed by Mezzetti and Renou (2012) keeps requirement (ii) but weakens
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requirement (i) so that any outcome in the range of the SCC is possibly supported by a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.21 We discuss their notion in Section 7.4.
We are now ready to state our Nash implementation result for the case of SCCs.
Theorem 4 Assume that there are at least three agents. An SCC F is implementable in
Nash equilibria if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity.
Remark: The implementing mechanism that will be constructed for this result may be
infinite. However, if F (Θ) is a finite set, Theorem 4 establishes Nash implementation by a
finite mechanism even for the case of SCCs.
Remark: When there are only two agents, we can still show that every Maskin-monotonic
SCC F is weakly implementable in Nash equilibrium. That is, there exists a mechanism
M = ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I such that for any state θ ∈ Θ and m ∈ supp (NE(Γ(M, θ))), it follows
that supp(g(m)) ∈ F (θ) and τi (m) = 0 for every i ∈ I. The difficulty of strengthening weak
implementation so that it becomes the standard full implementation lies in how to specify
an outcome when the two agents disagree on which outcome to be chosen under the true
state.
7.2 Small Transfer
One potential deficiency of the mechanisms we propose for Theorems 2 is that the size of
transfers may be large. In this section, we use the technique introduced by Abreu and
Matsushima (1994) to show that if the SCF satisfies Maskin monotonicity in the restricted
domain without transfer, then it is Nash-implementable with arbitrarily small transfers.
We first propose a notion of Nash implementation with zero transfer on the equilibrium
and bounded transfer off the equilibrium.
Definition 11 An SCF f is implementable in Nash equilibria with transfer bounded
by τ¯ if there exists a mechanism M = ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I such that for any state θ ∈ Θ
21We have another way of accommodating SCCs. Let F : Θ⇒ A be a deterministic SCC and for simplicity
suppose that A is a fintie set. We construct a stochastic SCF f such that supp(f(θ)) = F (θ) for each θ ∈ Θ.
Due to the linearity of expected utility, it is easy to see that if F is a Maskin-monotonic SCC or set-monotonic
SCC (a weaker monotonicity condition than Maskin-monotonicity defined in Mezzetti and Renou (2012)),
then the translated SCF f is a Maskin-monotonic. Hence, f is Nash implementable in our sense.
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and m ∈ M , (i) there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game Γ(M, θ); (ii)
m ∈ supp (NE(Γ(M, θ))) ⇒ g (m) = f (θ) and τi (m) = 0 for every i ∈ I; and (iii)
|τi (m) | ≤ τ¯ for any m ∈M.
We propose a notion of Nash implementation in which there are no transfers on the
equilibrium and only arbitrarily small transfers off the equilibrium:
Definition 12 An SCF f is implementable in Nash equilibria with arbitrarily small
transfer if for any τ¯ > 0, the SCF f is implementable in Nash equilibria with transfer
bounded by τ¯ .
We say that an SCF f satisfies Maskin monotonicity in the restricted domain ∆ (A) if
f (θ) 6= f (θ′) implies that there is an agent i and some l(θ, θ′i) ∈ ∆ (A) such that l(θ, θ′i) ∈
SLi (f (θ) , θi) ∩ SU i (f (θ) , θ′i).
Remark: Maskin monotonicity in the restricted domain ∆ (A) indeed a strictly stronger con-
dition than Maskin monotonicity in the domain X as shown in Section 2.1, King Solomon’s
dilemma. Here, by imposing a stronger monotonicity condition, we obtain a stronger result,
Theorem 5.
Finally, we strengthen Assumption 1 throughout the paper:
Assumption 2 θi 6= θ′i ⇒ ui (·, θi) and ui (·, θ′i) induce different preference orders on ∆ (A).
Again, given the assumption, we have the following result:
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, for each i ∈ I, there exists a function
li : Θi → ∆ (A) such that for any θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 6= θ′i,
vi (li (θi) , θi) > vi (li (θ
′
i) , θi) .
Theorem 5 Under Assumption 2, an SCF fA : Θ → ∆(A) is implementable in Nash
equilibria with arbitrarily small transfer if fA satisfies Maskin monotonicity in the restricted
domain.
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7.3 Infinite State Space
One significant assumption we have made in this paper is that the state space is finite.
In Appendix A.6, we extend Theorem 2 to a compact state space in which the agents’
utility functions are continuous. A similar extension was raised as a question left open in
Abreu and Matsushima (1992) (see their Section 5), and it remains unknown to the best
of our knowledge. In appendix A.6, we construct an infinite extension of the implementing
mechanism for mixed-strategy Nash implementation. A notable feature of this extension is
that as long as the setting is compact and continuous, the resulting implementing mechanism
will also be compact and continuous. Keeping this feature is important in differentiating our
construction from the traditional way of using integer games. We state the result as follows:
Theorem 6 Suppose that A is a finite set of pure alternatives and Θ is a Polish space.
Then, an SCF f satisfies Maskin monotonicity if and only if there exists a mechanism which
implements f in mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if Θ is compact and both the
cardinalization vi (a, ·) and the SCF are continuous functions on Θ, then the mechanism has
a compact set of messages, a continuous outcome function, and a continuous transfer rule.
This extension overcomes two main difficulties. First, in a finite state space, the transfer
rules τ 1i,j and τ
2
i,j which we define in (8) and (9) impose either a large penalty or a large
reward as long as the designer sees a discrepancy in the agents’ announcements. With a
continuum of states/types, however, such a drastic change in transfer will necessarily result
in discontinuity. Hence, our first challenge is to suitably define τ 1i,j and τ
2
i,j so that they vary
continuously in incentivizing truth-telling. Second, in a finite setting, we can choose just the
contingent weight (i.e., the ε in the function ei,j (·)) so that a test agent challenges only when
he is supposed to (in the sense that conditions (6) and (7) are satisfied). This is because
in a finite world, there is a uniform lower bound for the loss from a false challenge and for
the gain from making a correct challenge. Without a uniform lower bound, the weighting
function ei,j (·) can no longer take a binary value and needs to vary continuously, depending
on the gain or loss from the challenge associated with a message profile. In particular, we
will establish a counterpart of the conditions (6) and (7) as Lemmas 4 and 5 in Appendix
A.6.
40
7.4 The Ordinal Approach
We have assumed that the agents are expected utility maximizers and have used lotteries to
elicit their cardinal preferences. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether our implementation
results critically depend on the cardinalization of the preferences over lotteries. To answer
this question, we now introduce the notion of ordinal Nash implementation, which requires
that the mixed-strategy Nash implementation holds for any cardinal representation of the
ordinal preferences over a finite set of pure alternatives A. This is the approach proposed
by Mezzetti and Renou (2012).
Suppose that at state θ ∈ Θ, agents only have common knowledge about their ordinal
rankings over the set of pure alternatives A. We write the induced ordinal preference profile
at state θ by (θii )i∈I . We denote (vi)i∈I as a cardinal representation of (θii )i∈I,θi∈Θi , i.e., for
each a, a
′ ∈ A, i ∈ I, and θ ∈ Θ, we have vi(a; θi) ≥ vi(a′ ; θi) ⇔ a θii a′ . We assume that
all cardinal representations are bounded and normalize have the range [0, 1] . Again, each
cardinal representation vi induces an expected utility function on ∆ (A) which we abuse the
notation to also denote as vi. We denote V
θ
i the set of all cardinal representations vi (·, θi) of
θii . Following Mezzetti and Renou (2012), we focus our discussion on the case of an SCF
f : Θ→ A.
An SCF f is said to be ordinally Nash implementable if it is implementable in Nash
equilibria “independently of the cardinal representation,” i.e., there exists a mechanism M
such that, for any profile of cardinal representations v = (vi)i∈I of (θii )i∈I,θi∈Θi and θ ∈ Θ,
the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
m ∈ Γ(M, θ, v) such that g(m) = f (θ) and τi(m) = 0 for every i ∈ I; and (ii) for every
m ∈ supp(NE(Γ(M, θ, v))), we have supp(g(m)) = f(θ) and τi(m) = 0 for every i ∈ I. To
prove our main theorem in this section, we strengthen Assumption 1 into the following:
Assumption 3 θi 6= θ′i ⇒ θii and θ
′
i
i induce different preference orders on A.
With this assumption, we obtain a stronger version of Lemma 1, namely, there is a set of
dictator lotteries that work regardless of the cardinal representation. By Assumption 3, the
dictator lottery constructed remains valid as long as the preferences exhibit monotonicity
with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. (See the proof of Lemma in Abreu and
Matsushima (1992).)
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Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. For each i ∈ I, there exists a function yi :
Θi → ∆ (A) such that for any θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 6= θ′i and any cardinal representation vi(·)
of (θii )θi∈Θi,
ui(yi(θi), θi) > ui(yi(θ
′
i), θi).
We first introduce the following definitions of contour set under ordinal preferences.
For (a, θi) ∈ A×Θi, under ordinal preference θii , we denote the upper-contour set, the
lower-contour set, the strict upper-contour set, and the strict lower-contour set as follows:
Ui (a, θi) =
{
a′ ∈ A : a′ θii a
}
;
Li (a, θi) =
{
a′ ∈ A : a θii a′
}
;
SUi (a, θi) =
{
a′ ∈ A : a′ θii a
}
;
SLi (a, θi) =
{
a′ ∈ A : a θii a′
}
;
where θii denotes the strict preference induced by θii . We now introduce the notion of
ordinal almost monotonicity proposed by Sanver (2006) as the key condition in this section.
Definition 13 An SCF f satisfies ordinal almost monotonicity if for any pair of states
θ and θ′, with f (θ) 6= f (θ′), there is some agent i ∈ I such that
Li (f (θ) , θi) ∩ SUi (f (θ) , θ′i) 6= ∅,
or
SLi (f (θ) , θi) ∩ Ui (f (θ) , θ′i) 6= ∅.
Thus, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 7 Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Then, an SCF f is ordinally Nash imple-
mentable if and only if it satisfies ordinal almost monotonicity.
We prove Theorem 7 as a straightforward application of Theorem 6. While Mezzetti
and Renou (2012) and Theorem 7 both study ordinal implementation in mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium, there are three essential differences. First, Mezzetti and Renou (2012) requires
only the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria but we require the existence of pure-strategy
equilibria following Maskin (1999). Second, we use monetary transfers, while Mezzetti and
Renou (2012) do not. The first difference makes our ordinal approach more demanding than
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that of Mezzetti and Renou (2012). Third, Mezzetti and Renou (2012) studies the case of
SCC which we omit here. Specifically, Mezzetti and Renou (2012) propose a notion called
ordinal set-monotonicity for SCC. They show that the notion of ordinal set-monotonicity is
weaker than Maskin monotonicity and is necessary and almost sufficient in their notion of
implementation in mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Ordinal almost monotonicity is slightly
weaker than set-monotonicity and yet characterizes the stronger notion of ordinal mixed-
strategy Nash implementation a` la Maskin (1999) for the case of SCF in the environment
with transfer.
8 Concluding Remarks
Despite its tremendous success, implementation theory has also been criticized on various
fronts. In particular, the major criticism is that the mechanisms used to achieve full imple-
mentation are not “natural,” as reflected in the quote from Jackson (1992) at the beginning
of the paper. To address such criticism, Jackson (1992) proposes that we may restrict our
attention to “natural mechanisms” and study which SCFs can be fully implemented, even
at the cost of restricting attention to more specific environments.
We consider the results in this paper as a first yet important step in advancing the
Jackson program. Specifically, we focus on environments with lotteries and transfer and pro-
vide well-behaved implementing mechanisms for pure-strategy Nash implementation, mixed-
strategy Nash implementation, and rationalizable implementation. We also show that our
result and the idea of our implementing mechanism are amenable to prominent extensions
to the case of SCC, infinite settings, and ordinal settings.
As a first benchmark, we follow Maskin and AM in focusing our study of full Nash
implementation on the complete-information setup. In addition, our results also invite pos-
sible extensions to a Bayesian setup (Jackson (1991)) and a robust setup (Bergemann and
Morris (2009)), which we would like to explore in future research. Indeed, our approach
is intimately related to the burgeoning literature on repeated implementation in particular,
such as Lee and Sabourian (2011) and Mezzetti and Renou (2017), where continuation values
can serve as transfers in our construction.22 We leave the study on repreated implementation
for future research.
22We thank Hamid Sabourian for drawing our attention to this point.
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A Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide the proofs omitted from the main body of the paper.
A.1 Theorem 1 with Two Agents
We now provide an example to show that we cannot prove Theorem 1 with two agents.
The example demonstrates that when there are only two agents, a direct mechanism cannot
implement some Maskin-monotonic SCF in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This suggests
that, even with the help of lottery and transfer, Nash implementation with two agents
generally requires indirect mechanisms as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Suppose that there are two agents: A and B; two states: α and β; and four pure
alternatives: a, b, c, and d. Define an SCF such that f (α) = a and f (β) = b. Agents’
utilities across different states are described in the following table where v > v > 0 and
0 < ε < (v − v)/2:
vA α β
a v v
b 0 0
c −ε ε
d ε −ε
vB α β
a 0 0
b v v
c −ε ε
d ε −ε
.
Specifically, since d ∈ SLA(f(β), β)∩SUA(f(β), α) and c ∈ SLB(f(α), α)∩SUB(f(α), β),
it follows that f is Maskin-monotonic. Hence, by Theorem 2, f is implementable in mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium by a finite indirect mechanism. We establish the following claim
in Appendix A.1.
Claim 5 No direct mechanism implements f in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists such a direct mechanism (g, (τi))i∈I (recall
that Mi = Θ) which implements f . Hence, we set g (α, α) = a, g (β, β) = b. We write
m θi m′ if and only if vi (g (m) , θ) + τi (m) ≥ vi (g (m′) , θ) + τi (m′) for any m and m′ in
Θ2. We have self-selection conditions:
(θ, θ) θi (θ′, θ) for θ, θ′ ∈ {α, β} and i ∈ {A,B} . (18)
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In addition, to guarantee that a false consensus is not an equilibrium, we need a whistle
blower in each state. The following claim shows that agent A cannot be whistle blower when
the true state is β and the announced false state is α, and agent B cannot be a whistle
blower when the true state is α and the announced false state is β.
By Claim 5.1, for Nash implementation to be achievable by the direct mechanism,
agent B must be the one who deviates to knock out (α, α) as an equilibrium in state β and
agent A must be the one who deviates to knock out (β, β) in state α. However, Claim 5.2
shows that we cannot satisfy both simultaneously. By two claims, we therefore conclude
that there exists some state θ and θ′ 6= θ such that (θ′, θ′) is an equilibrium in θ, i.e., it is
impossible to implement f in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium by a direct mechanism.
Claim 5.1. We must have (α, α) βA (β, α) and (β, β) αB (β, α).
Proof. We prove that (α, α) βA (β, α). The proof of (β, β) αB (β, α) is similar and so
omitted. Suppose to the contrary that (β, α) βA (α, α). Without loss of generality, we write
the allocation at (β, α) as a lottery (pa, pb, pc, pd) ∈ ∆ (A) (where pa˜ denotes the probability
assigned to a˜) and transfer pair (tA, tB). Then, we have
pav¯ + pb × 0 + pc × ε+ pd × (−ε) + tA > v¯. (19)
The self-selection condition (18) for i = A and θ = α implies that
v ≥ pav¯ + pb × 0 + pc × (−ε) + pd × ε+ tA. (20)
Summing up (19) and (20), we get
2 (pc − pd) ε > (1− pa) (v¯ − v) . (21)
Since ε < (v − v)/2, it follows from (21) that pc − pd > 1− pa which is a contradiction.
Claim 5.2. It is impossible to have (α, β) βB (α, α) and (α, β) αA (β, β) .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that we have (α, β) βB (α, α) and (α, β) αA (β, β). Again,
we write the allocation at (α, β) as a lottery (pa, pb, pc, pd) ∈ ∆ (A) and transfer pair (tA, tB).
Since (α, β) βB (α, α), we have
pa × 0 + pb × v + pc × ε+ pd × (−ε) + tB > 0. (22)
The self-selection condition (18) for i = B and θ = α implies that
pa × 0 + pb × v¯ + pc × (−ε) + pd × ε+ tB ≤ 0. (23)
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Subtracting (23) from (22), we have
pb (v − v¯) + 2 (pc − pd) ε > 0. (24)
Hence, pc−pd > 0. Similarly, (α, β) αA (β, β) and the self-selection condition (18) for i = A
and θ = β imply that pd − pc > 0. This is a contradiction.
A.2 Maskin Monotonicity and Maskin Monotonicity∗
We provide an SCF which satisfies strict Maskin monotonicity but not strict Maskin monotonicity∗.23
This implies that rationalizable implementation is more restrictive than Nash implementa-
tion. Recall that in environments with transfers, strict Maskin monotonicity is equiva-
lent to Maskin monotonicity and strict Maskin monotonicity∗ is also equivalent to Maskin
monotonicity∗. Let A = {a, b, c, d} , I = {1, 2} , X = ∆ (A) × R2, and Θ = {α, β, γ, δ} .
The agents’ utility functions are given in the two tables below. Consider the following SCF
f (α) = f (β) = f (γ) = a and f (δ) = b. For simplicity of notation, we write a˜ ∈ A for
(a, 0, 0) ∈ X which is a degenerate allocation with no transfer to any agent.
vA α β γ δ
a 3 2 2 2
b 2 3 1 3
c 1 1 3 1
d 0 0 0 0
vB α β γ δ
a 3 2 2 2
b 1 0 1 1
c 2 1 3 3
d 0 3 0 0
Claim 6 For every agent i and θ ∈ Θ, SLi (a, θ) ⊂ Li (a, α).
Proof. Observe that for any agent, any a˜ ∈ A\ {a}, and any θ ∈ Θ, the utility difference
between a and a˜ is larger at α than at θ, that is,
vi (a, α)− vi (a˜, α) ≥ vi (a, θ)− vi (a˜, θ) .
Hence, for any x ∈ X, we have ui(a, θ)− ui (x, θ) ≥ 0 whenever ui(a, θ˜)− ui(x, θ˜) ≥ 0.
Claim 7 The SCF f violates strict Maskin monotonicity∗.
23This example is considered a two-agent version of the example in Appendix A of Jain (2017) which also
accommodate the environments with lottery and transfers.
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary partition finer than Pf = {{α, β, γ} , {δ}} . Note that P (δ) =
{δ} for any partition P finer than Pf .
Case 1. α ∈ P (β) and α ∈ P (γ). In this case, P = Pf and hence P (α) = {α, β, γ}. Since
SLA (a, β) = SLA (a, δ) and SLB (a, γ) = SLB (a, δ). Thus, SLi (a,P (α)) ⊂ Li (a, δ) but
f (α) 6= f (δ). Hence, f violates strict Maskin monotonicity∗ for such P .
Case 2. α 6∈ P (β) or α 6∈ P (γ). We derive a contradiction for α 6∈ P (β) and the argument
for the case with α 6∈ P (γ) is similar and so omitted. If α 6∈ P (β), then by Claim 6, we
have SLi (a,P (β)) ⊂ Li (a, α). Then, f violates strict Maskin monotonicity∗ for P since
SLi (a,P (β)) ⊂ Li (a, α) and α 6∈ P (β).
Claim 8 The SCF f satisfies strict Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. Indeed, observe that b ∈ SLA (a, α) ∩ SUA (a, δ), c ∈ SLB (a, β) ∩ SUB (a, δ),
b ∈ SLA (a, γ) ∩ SUA (a, δ), a ∈ SLA (b, δ) ∩ SUA (b, α), d ∈ SLB (b, δ) ∩ SUB (b, β), and
a ∈ SLA (b, δ) ∩ SLA (b, γ) .
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Let θ ∈ Θ be a true state. We prove the if-part of Theorem 3 in five steps.
Step 0: Suppose f satisfies Maskin monotonicity∗ and let P denote the partition such that
(i) P is weakly finer than Pf ; (ii) for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, whenever θ′ 6∈ P (θ), there exists i ∈ I
for whom
Li (f(θ),P (θ)) ∩ SU i(f(θ), θ′i) 6= ∅.
Then, for each θ ∈ Θ, we have P (θ) = ×i∈IPi (θ) where Pi (θ) ⊂ Θi .
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose that there exist θi ⊂ P (θ) for every i and
(θii)i∈I /∈ P (θ), where θii ∈ Θi is the projection of θi ∈ Θ into Θi. Consider θ
′ ≡ (θii)i∈I .
Since θ
′ ∈ Θ and θ′ /∈ P (θ), it follows from Maskin monotonicity∗ that there exists an agent
i∗ such that
Li∗ (f(θ),P (θ)) ∩ SU i∗(f(θ), θ′i∗) 6= ∅.
Since θi
∗ ∈ P (θ), we have
Li
(
f(θ), θi
∗
i∗
) ∩ SU i(f(θ), θ′i∗) 6= ∅.
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Finally, recall that θ
′
= (θii)i∈I . Hence, θ
′
i∗ = θ
i∗
i∗ which implies that
Li
(
f(θ), θi
∗
i∗
) ∩ SU i(f(θ), θi∗i∗) 6= ∅,
which is a contradiction.
Step 1: For any agent i and any mi ∈ S∞i (M, θ), there is some type profile θ′−i such that(
m1i , θ
′
−i
)
identifies a state θ˜ ∈ P (θ).
Proof. Fix i ∈ I and mi ∈ S∞i (M, θ). Then, there is a conjecture λi ∈ ∆
(
S∞−i (M, θ)
)
against which mi is a best reply. Assume that for any m−i ∈supp(λi), ei,j (mi,mj) = ε. By
(14) and (15), we have m1i = θi. Then, Step 1 follows by setting θ
′
−i = θ−i. Now suppose
that there exists m−i ∈ S∞−i (M, θ) with λi (m−i) > 0 such that ei,j (mi,mj) = 0, i.e., there
exists θ˜ such that
m1 identifies some θ˜ ∈ Θ;
m2j ∼ m3j ∼ θ˜ and Bm4j (θ˜)(θ˜) = f(θ˜),∀j ∈ I.
We claim that θ˜ ∈ P (θ). Suppose on the contrary that θ˜ 6∈ P (θ). Then, since f
satisfies strict Maskin monotonicity∗, there exists some agent j ∈ I for whom Bθj(θ˜) 6= f(θ˜).
By (12) we know that
uj(C
ε
i,j(m), θj) > uj(f(θ˜), θj) if m
3
i = θ˜. (25)
Now we construct m˜j that is identical to mj except that m˜
4
j(θ˜) = θj. In the following, we shall
show that m˜j strictly dominates mj against any m−j ∈ S∞−j (M, θ), which contradicts the
hypothesis that mj ∈ S∞j (M, θ). Fix m−j ∈ S∞−j(M, θ). We first observe that ej,j(m˜j, m˜j) =
ε because we have Bθj(θ˜) 6= f(θ˜) and m3j ∼ θ˜.
Second, we know that (mj,m−j) and (m˜j,m−j) induce different allocations only when
agents j and k are picked up and agent k announces a state m3k which is equivalent to θ˜.
This happens with positive probability since we allow for k = j and m˜3j = m
3
j ∼ θ˜. In that
case, (mj,m−j) implements f(θ˜), while (m˜j,m−j) implements Cεk,j(m˜j,m−j). By (25), agent
j gets a strictly better payoff under m˜ = (m˜j,m−j) than under (mj, m˜−j). Hence, m˜j strictly
dominates mj against any m−j ∈ S∞−j (M, θ).
Step 2: For any agent i and any mi ∈ S∞i (M, θ), we have m2i ∼ θ˜ where θ˜ ∈ P (θ).
Proof. By Step 1, we know that for every i ∈ I, if mi ∈ S∞i (M, θ) , then there exists θˆ−i
such that (m1i , θˆ−i) identifies some θ˜ ∈ P (θ). Since the partition P has product structure by
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Step 0, m1 identifies some θ˜ ∈ P (θ). Suppose by way of contradiction that m2i = θ′ 6∼ θ. Now,
we construct m˜i = (m
1
i , θ,m
3
i ,m
4
i ) which is identical to mi except that m˜
2
i = θi. We claim
that announcing m˜i is strictly better than announcing mi against any m−i ∈ S∞−i (M, θ).
Fix m−i ∈ S∞−i(M, θ). Since θ′ 6∼ θ, (mi,m−i) is “not” consistent. Consider two cases:
Case 1. If ei,j (m˜i,mj) = ε, then (m˜i,m−i) and (mi,m−i) implement the same allocation
since mi and m˜i only differ in their second report. In terms of transfers incurred, (m˜i,m−i)
avoids the penalty from τ 2i (·), while (mi,m−i) incurs the penalty from τ 2i (·). Hence, m˜i is a
better reply than mi against m−i.
Case 2. If ei,j (m˜i,m−i) = 0, then (m˜i,m−i) and (mi,m−i) implement the same allocation
since mi and m˜i only differ in their second component. Moreover, (mi,m−i) incurs the
penalty η′ to agent i, whereas (m˜i,m−i) does not. It follows that m˜i is a strictly better
response than mi against m−i. This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: For any i ∈ I and mi ∈ S∞i (M, θ), we have m3i ∼ θ˜ where θ˜ ∈ P (θ).
Proof. By Step 2, we know that for every i ∈ I and mi ∈ S∞i (M, θ), we have m2i ∼ θ.
Suppose on the contrary that m3i = θ
′ 6∼ θ. Now, we construct m˜i = (m1i ,m2i , θ,m4i ) which
is identical to mi except the third component of the message. We claim that m˜i strictly
dominates mi against any m−i ∈ S∞−i (M, θ). Fix m−i ∈ S∞−i(M, θ). Indeed, (m˜i,m−i)
avoids the penalty η from τ 3i (·), while (mi,m−i) incurs the penalty η from τ 3i (·). The
potential loss from (m˜i,m−i) rather than (mi,m−i) is bounded by η+D, which may happen
when (m˜i,m−i) is not consistent without any challenge, while (mi,m−i) is with a challenge.
It follows from (16) that m˜i is a better response against m−i than mi. This implies that m˜i
strictly dominates mi against any m−i ∈ S∞−i (M, θ), which contradicts the hypothesis that
mi ∈ S∞i (M, θ). This completes the proof of Step 3.
Step 4: g (m) = f(θ) and τi (m) = 0 for every i ∈ I and m ∈ S∞ (M, θ) .
Proof. By Steps 1 through 3, for any m ∈ S∞ (M, θ) , we have that m1 identifies some
θ˜ ∈ P (θ) and θ˜ ∼ m2i ∼ m3i for every i ∈ I. Moreover, since θ˜ ∈ P(θ), if Bm4i (θ˜)(θ˜) 6= f(θ˜),
then Bm4i (θ˜)(θ˜) belongs to SLi(f(θ˜), θi). By (13), player i is worse off by challenging θ˜ ∈
P(θ). Hence, Bm4i (θ˜)(θ˜) = f(θ˜) for every mi ∈ S∞i (M, θ). We thus conclude that for every
m ∈ S∞(M, θ) we have ei,j (mi,mj) = 0 for any agents i and j, no transfer is incurred, and
f(θ˜) is implemented. Again, since θ˜ ∈ P (θ), it follows that g (m) = f(θ). This completes
the proof of Step 4.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We propose a mechanismM = ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I that is used to prove the if-part of Theorem
4. We define the message space, allocation rule, and transfer rule below. Let Γi denote the
set of functions from F (Θ) to Θi. Observe that Γi is a finite set when F (Θ) and Θi are
both finite sets. Call each γi a challenge function of agent i which is viewed as a plan to
challenge contingent on the possible outcome in F (θ).
A generic message of agent i is described as follows:
mi =
(
m1i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ,m
4
i
) ∈Mi = M1i ×M2i ×M3i ×M4i = Θi ×Θ× Γi × (F (Θ))Θ
where m4i : Θ → F (Θ) satisfies m4i [θ] ∈ F (θ) for each θ ∈ Θ. That is, agent i is asked to
make (1) an announcements of agent i’s own type (i.e., m1i ); (2) an announcement of the
state (i.e., m2i ); (3) a challenge function (i.e., m
3
i ); and (4) an announcement of a mapping
from states to outcomes within the corresponding image of the SCC (i.e., m4i ). For the ease
of notation, as we do in the case of SCFs, we write m2i,j = θ˜j if agent i’s report in m
2
i that
agent j’s type is θ˜j.
For each m ∈M , let
ei,j (mi,mj) =
 0, if m2i = m2j and Bm3j (m4i [m2i ]) (m2i ,m4i [m2i ]) = m4i [m2i ];ε, otherwise.
The allocation rule is then defined as follows: for each m ∈M ,
Rule 1: If there exist θ˜ ∈ Θ, x ∈ F (θ˜), and i ∈ I such that m2k = θ˜ for every agent k ∈ I, and
m4j [θ˜] = x for all j 6= i, then
g(m) =
1
I(I − 1)
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I\{i}
[
ei,j (mi,mj)
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ei,j (mi,mj))Bm3j (x)(θ˜, x)
]
where yk : Θ→ X is the dictator lottery for agent k which is defined in Lemma 1.
Rule 2: Otherwise,
g (m) =
1
I(I − 1)
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I\{i}
[
ei,j (mi,mj)
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ei,j (mi,mj))Bm3j (m4i [m2i ])
(
m2i ,m
4
i [m
2
i ]
)]
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That is, the designer first chooses a pair of distinct agents (i, j) with equal probability.
We distinguish two cases: (1) if the second reports of both agents i and j are consistent
and agent j does not challenge agent i, then we implement m4i [m
2
i ]; (2) if either the second
reports of both agents i and j are inconsistent or agent j challenges agent i, then we consider
two subcases: (2.1) if everyone reports a common state θ˜, and I − 1 agents agree on the
allocation announced in their fourth report, say x, then we implement the compound lottery
ε× 1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ε)×Bm3j (x)(θ˜, x).
(2.2), Otherwise, we implement the compound lottery
Cεi,j(m) = ε×
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ε)×Bm3j (m4i [m2i ])
(
m2i ,m
4
i [m
2
i ]
)
.
For any message profile m ∈ M and agent i ∈ I, we specify the transfer from agent i
as follows:
τi(m) =
∑
j 6=i
[
τ 1i,j(m) + τ
2
i,j(m)
]
.
By strict Maskin monotonicity of the SCC F , we can choose ε > 0 sufficiently small
such that for all m ∈M , i, j ∈ I, and θ ∈ Θ, we have
uj(C
ε
i,j(m), θj) > uj(x, θj) if Bm3j (x)(m
2
i , x) 6= x where m4i [m2i ] = x and m3j = θj (26)
uj(C
ε
i,j(m), θj) < ui(x, θj) if Bm3j (x)(m
2
i , x) 6= x where m4i [m2i ] = x and m2i = θ. (27)
We double the scale of transfer rule in Section 5.1.3 by replacing η with 2η and −η with
−2η in the definition of τ 1i,j and τ 1i,j. Moreover, we add one more transfer rule as follows,
τ 3i,j (m) =
 0, if Bm3j (m4i [m2i ]) (m2i ,m4i [m2i ]) = m4i [m2i ];−η, if Bm3j (m4i [m2i ]) (m2i ,m4i [m2i ]) 6= m4i [m2i ].
That is, agent i is asked to pay η if his reported outcome m4i [m
2
i ] are challenged by agent j
(via agent j’s challenge function m3j). Note that we still require that η be greater than the
payoff difference D as in (10) in Section 5.1.3.
To prove Theorem 4, observe that Claims 1, 2 and 3 hold with exactly the same proof.
In the following, we establish Claim 9 as the counterpart of Claim 4 in Theorem 2 in the
modified mechanism above.
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Claim 9 No one challenges any social outcome at the common state announced in the second
report, i.e., for any pair of agents i and j, mi ∈supp(σi), and mj ∈supp(σj), we have
Bm3j (m4i [θ˜])
(θ˜, m4i [θ˜]) = m
4
i [θ˜].
Proof. By Claim 3, denote by θ˜ the common state announced in the second report. For
each l ∈ F (Θ), we define the set of agents:
J (l) ≡
{
j ∈ I : SLj(l, θ˜j) ∩ Uj(l, θj) = ∅
}
.
First, if j ∈ J
(
m4i [θ˜]
)
, thenBm3j (m4i [θ˜])(θ˜, m
4
i [θ˜]) 6= m4i [θ˜] implies thatBm3j (m4i [θ˜])(θ˜, m4i [θ˜])
is strictly worse than m4i [θ˜] under the true type of agent j. Hence, whenever m
3
j triggers
a challenge and the allocation Bm3j (m4i [θ˜])(θ˜, m
4
i [θ˜]), agent j can profitably deviate to with-
draw the challenge by annoucing m˜j =
(
m1j ,m
2
j , m˜
3
j ,m
4
j
)
such that m˜3j(m
4
i [θ˜]) = θ˜i and
m˜3j (l) = m
3
j (l) for any l 6= m4i [θ˜].
Hence, to establish the claim, it suffices to prove that J
(
m4i [θ˜]
)
= I for each message
mi ∈supp(σi) and each agent i. Suppose to the contrary that for some agent i and some
message mi ∈supp(σi), we have agent j /∈ J (l). Then, by adding a small transfer to j, we
have
SLj(m4i [θ˜], θ˜j) ∩ SUj(m4i [θ˜], θj) 6= ∅. (28)
First, we claim thatBm3j (m4i [θ˜])(θ˜, m
4
i [θ˜]) 6= m4i [θ˜] for everymj ∈supp(σj). Indeed, ifBm3j (m4i [θ˜])(θ˜, m4i [θ˜]) =
m4i [θ˜] for some m
4
i [θ˜], agent j can profitably deviate to announce m˜j =
(
m1j ,m
2
j , m˜
3
j ,m
4
j
)
such
that m˜3j(m
4
i [θ˜]) = θj and m˜
3
j (l) = m
3
j (l) for any l ∈ F (θ˜). This deviation results in the better
allocation Bθj(θ˜, m
4
i [θ˜]) ∈ SUj(f(θ˜), θj).
Second, since Bm3j (m4i [θ˜])(θ˜, m
4
i [θ˜]) 6= m4i [θ˜] for every mj ∈supp(σj), by playing mi agent
i suffers from the penalty η by τ 3i,j. We then derive a contradiction in each of the following
two cases. Firstly, if there is some l ∈ F
(
θ˜
)
such that J (l) = I, then agent i can profitably
deviate to announce m˜i where m˜i is identical to mi except that m˜
4
i [θ˜] = l. By doing so agent i
avoids paying the penalty η since no agent j will challenge m4i [θ˜] = l to obtain an allocation
in Uj(l, θj). This contradicts to the assumption that σ is a Nash equilibrium. Secondly,
suppose that J (l) 6= I for every l ∈ F
(
θ˜
)
. That is, for each mi ∈supp(σi), there is some
agent k /∈ J
(
m4i [θ˜]
)
. It follows that Bm3j (m4i [θ˜])
(
θ˜, m4i [θ˜]
)
6= m4i [θ˜] for every mk ∈supp(σk).
In other words, for each mi ∈supp(σi), for some agent k we have ei,k (mi,mk) = ε for every
mk ∈supp(σk) . It then follows that for every message of every agent k, the dictator lottery
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is triggered with σ−k-positive probability. Thus, by (4), each agent k has strict incentive
to announce the true type in his first report, i.e., m1k = θk for each mk ∈supp(σk) and
agent k ∈ I. By Claim 2, we conclude that θ˜ = θ. This, together with (28), implies that
SLj(f(θ), θj) ∩ Uj(f(θ), θj) 6= ∅, which is impossible.
It only remains to prove the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Claim 10 For any θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ F (θ) , there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
m ∈M of the game Γ(M, θ) such that g(m) = x and τi(m) = 0 for any i ∈ I.
Proof. Fix an SCF f : Θ → X with f (θ) = x. We argue that truth-telling (i.e., mi =
(θi, θ, θi, f) for each i ∈ I) constitutes a pure-strategy equilibrium. Under the message profile
m, for any i, j ∈ I, we have Bm3j (θ, x) = x and ei,j(mi,mj) = 0. Firstly, reporting m˜i with
m˜2i 6= θ suffers the penalty of η > D and hence cannot be a profitable deviation. Secondly,
reporting m˜i with m˜
2
i = θ and m˜
3
i 6= θi either leads to Bm3j (θ) = x and results in no change
in payoff or Bm3j (θ, x) which is strictly worse than x. Moreover, reporting m˜i with m˜
2
i = θ,
m˜3i = θi, and either m˜
1
i 6= θi or m˜4i 6= f does not affect the allocation or transfer. This
completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Recall that in the mechanism which we use to prove Theorem 2, agent i’s generic message
is given mi = (m
1
i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ) ∈ Θi×Θ×Θi. We expand m2i into H + 2 copies of Θ and define
mi = (m
1
i ,m
2
i , . . . ,m
H+4
i ) ∈ Θi × Θ× · · · ×Θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
H + 2 terms
×Θi
where H is a positive integer to be chosen later. For each message profile m ∈ M , the
allocation is defined as follows:
g(m) =
1
I(I − 1)
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6=i
[
ei,j (mi,mj)
1
I
∑
k∈I
lk
(
m1k
)
+
1− ei,j(mi,mj)
H + 1
[
H+2∑
h=3
ρ
(
mh
)
+BmH+4j
(
mH+3i
)]]
where lk : Θ→ ∆(A) is the dictator lottery for agent k defined in Lemma 2 and
ei,j (mi,mj) =
 0, if m2i = m2j = mhi = mhj and BmH+4j
(
mH+3i
)
= f(mH+3i ), ∀h ∈ {3, . . . , H + 3};
ε, otherwise.
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ρ
(
mh
)
=
 f(θ˜), if mhi = θ˜ for at least I − 1 agents;b, otherwise, where b is an arbitrary outcome in A.
We now define the transfer rule. For any message profile m ∈ M and agent i ∈ I, we
specify the transfer to agent i as follows:
τi(m) =
∑
j 6=i
[
τ 1,2i,j (m) + τ
2,2
i,j (m)
]
+
H+3∑
h=3
τhi (m) + di(m
2, . . . ,mH+3)
where γ, η, ξ > 0 (its size is determined later)
τ 1,2i,j (m) =

0, if m2i,j = m
2
j,j;
−γ if m2i,j 6= m2j,j and m2i,j 6= m1j ;
γ if m2i,j 6= m2j,j and m2i,j = m1j .
τ 2,2i,j (m) =
 0, if m2i,i = m2j,i;−γ, if m2i,i 6= m2j,i;
moreover, for any h ∈ {3, . . . , H + 3},
τhi (m) =
 −η, if for some θ˜, mhi 6= θ˜ but mhj = θ˜ for all j 6= i;0, otherwise,
and
di(m
2, . . . ,mH+3) =

−ξ, if m
h
i 6= m2i and mh′j = m2j for some h ∈ {3, . . . , H + 3},
for all h′ ∈ {2, . . . , h− 1} for all j 6= i;
0, otherwise.
Finally, we choose positive numbers γ, ξ,H, η,and ε such that
τ¯ > γ + (H + 1) η + ξ;
γ > ξ + εD
η > εD
ξ >
1
H
D + η.
More precisely, we first fix τ¯ and choose γ < 1
3
τ¯ and ξ < min
{
1
3
τ¯ , γ
}
. Second, we choose H
large enough so that ξ > 1
H
D. Third, we choose η small enough such that (H + 1) η < 1
3
τ¯
and ξ > 1
H
D+ η. Fourth, we choose ε small such that γ > ξ+ εD and η > εD. We can now
prove Theorem 5 following the three steps in the proof of Theorem 2.
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A.5.1 Contagion of Truth
Claim 11 If every agent j reports the truth in his first report (i.e., m1j = θj for any
mj ∈supp(σj)), then every agent j reports the truth in his 2nd,...,(H + 3)th report. That
is, mhj = θ for h = 2, . . . , H + 3.
First, every agent j reports the state truthfully in his 2nd report. This follows from
the proof of Claim 2 with only one minor difference: Here m2i may affect agent i’s payoff
through di (·) while it will not affect the allocation. However, a similar argument follows,
since we have γ > ξ + εD. This step corresponds to Property (b) in Abreu and Matsushima
(1994). Then, we can follow verbatim the argument on p. 12 of Abreu and Matsushima
(1994) which shows that every agent j reports the state truthfully in his hth report for every
h = 2, ..., H + 2. Finally, since ξ > 1
H
D+ η and mhi = θ for all h = 2, ..., H + 2 and for every
agent i, it is the best response for agent j to choose mH+3j = θ.
A.5.2 Consistency
Claim 12 Everyone reports the same state from their 2nd report to the last report. That is,
there exists θ˜ ∈ Θ such that, for any agent i ∈ I and any mi ∈ supp(σi), we have mhi = θ˜
for h = 2, . . . , H + 3.
Proof. We prove consistency in the three cases as in the proof of Claim 3. The proof for
the first two cases remains the same. For the third case, suppose that only one agent, say i,
tells a lie in the first report. For any h = 2, . . . , H + 2, as agent i believes that all the other
agent report the same state θ˜, by the rule ρ
(
mh
)
and τhi
(
mh
)
, we know mhi = θ˜.
A.5.3 No Challenge
Claim 13 No one challenges the common state announced in the (H + 3)th report, i.e.,
BmH+4j
(θ˜) = f(θ˜) for any j ∈ I.
The argument is the same as the proof of Claim 4.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6
For simplicity, assume that A is a finite set. Suppose that Θ is a metric space. For any
l ∈ ∆ (A) , we write vi (l, θi) = l · v¯i (θi) where v¯i (θi) is a vector of utilities over A induced by
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vi (·, θi). Let D ≡ maxi,θ∈Θ,a,a′∈∆(A)∪f(Θ) 2×|ui (a, θ)− ui (a′, θ)| . Let X¯ ≡ ∆ (A)× [−D,D]I
and identify X¯ with a compact subset of RI+|A|. Let d be a metric on Θ, di be the metric
on Θi, and ρ : X¯ × X¯ → R be a metric on the outcome space. We endow Θ and X with
the Borel sigma-algebra. Moreover, say that the setting is compact and continuous if Θ is
compact and v¯i and f are continuous functions on Θ.
We introduce the following version of best challenge scheme. For agent i of type θi, an
allocation x, and θ˜, we construct a lottery,
l(x, θ˜) =
ρ¯(x, θ˜)
1 + ρ¯(x, θ˜)
x+
1
1 + ρ¯(x, θ˜)
f(θ˜),
where ρ¯(x, θ˜) ≡ miny∈Ui(f(θ˜),θ˜i) ρ(x, y) and define
Bx(θ˜) =
 l(x, θ˜), if x ∈ SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i);f(θ˜), otherwise.
Say a function α : S → Y between two metric spaces S and Y endowed with the Borel
σ-algebra is analytic if its pre-image of any open set on Y is an analytic set. Since every
analytic set is universally measurable, an analytic function is ”almost” a measurable function
(see pp. 498-499 of Stinchcombe and White (1992)). We show below that the mechanism
which we are about to construct have analytic outcome function and transfer rule. Hence,
whenever we fix a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium σ which is a Borel probability measure
on M , we can work with the σ-completion of the Borel sigma-algebra on M to make all the
expected payoffs well defined.
Claim 14 Bx(θ˜) is an analytic function on X¯×Θ. If the setting is compact and continuous,
then Bx(θ˜) is a continuous function on X¯ ×Θ.
Proof. It also follows from Theorem 2.17 of Stinchcombe and White (1992) that ρ¯(·, ·) is
analytic on X¯×Θ and hence Bx(θ˜) is an analytic function on X¯×Θ. Then, by the theorem of
maximum, ρ¯ (·, ·) is jointly continuous on X¯×Θ. Let (x [n] , θ˜ [n]) be a sequence converging
to (x, θ˜). We show that Bx[n](θ˜ [n])→ Bx(θ˜) in each of the following two cases.
Case 1. x ∈ SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i).
In this case, Bx(θ˜) = l(x, f(θ˜)). Since f and ui are both continuous, it follows that
x [n] ∈ SLi(f(θ˜ [n]), θ˜i [n]) for large enough n. Thus, Bx[n](θ˜ [n]) = l(x [n] , θ˜ [n]). Hence,
Bx[n](θ˜ [n])→ l(x, f(θ˜)) as (x [n] , θ˜ [n])→ (x, θ˜).
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Case 2. x 6∈ SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i).
In this case, Bx(θ˜) = f(θ˜). If there is some n such that x [n] /∈ SLi(f(θ˜ [n]), θ˜i [n]) for
every n ≥ n, then Bx[n](θ˜ [n]) = f(θ˜ [n]). Since f is continuous and θ˜ [n]→ θ˜, it follows that
Bx[n](θ˜ [n] → f(θ˜). Now suppose that there is a subsequence of x [n] , θ˜ [n], say itself, such
that x [n] ∈ SLi(f(θ˜ [n]), θ˜i [n]) for every n. Then, we have Bx[n](θ˜ [n]) = l(x [n] , f(θ˜ [n])).
Since x 6∈ SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i), it follows that ρ¯(x, θ˜) = 0. Since ρ¯ is jointly continuous, we must
have ρ¯(x [n] , θ˜ [n])→ 0. By construction of l(x [n] , f(θ˜ [n])), l(x [n] , f(θ˜ [n]))→ f(θ˜). Hence,
Bx[n](θ˜ [n])→ f(θ˜).
Claim 15 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For each i ∈ I, there exists an analytic func-
tion yi : Θi → X such that for any θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 6= θ′i,
vi (yi (θi) , θi) > vi (yi (θ
′
i) , θi) ,
and for any x ∈ X¯
ui
(
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk (θ
′
k) , θi
)
< ui (x, θi) .
Moreover, if the setting is compact and continuous, yi (θi) is continuous on Θi.
Proof. We construct the dictator lotteries in the infinite state space. We construct
(li (θi) , t1 (θi) , ..., tI (θi)) ∈ X¯
where li (θi) is a lottery over A and tk (θi) ∈ [0, D] for any k, and let
yi (θi) = (li (θi) , t1 − 2D, ..., tI − 2D) .
Hence, we obtain ui
(
1
I
∑
k∈I yk (θ
′
k) , θi
)
< ui (x, θi) for any θi and any x ∈ X¯. Let l∗ be
the uniform lottery over A, i.e., l∗ [a] = 1/ |A|. Pick r < 1/ |A|. Consider the maximization
problem as follows:
max
(l,t)
(l, t) · (v¯i (θi) , 1)
s.t. ‖(l, t)− (l∗, 1)‖ ≤ r
The Kuhn-Tucker condition for (li (θi) , ti (θi)) to be the solution is
v¯i (θi)− λi (θi) (2 (li (θi) , ti (θi))− (l∗, 1)) = 0
where λi (θi) > 0 as v¯i (θi) > 0. Hence, (li (θi) , ti (θi)) =
1
2
(
v¯i(θi)
λi(θi)
+ (l∗, 1)
)
. For every θi 6= θ′i,
since v¯i (θi) is not an affine transform of v¯i (θ
′
i), it follows that (li (θi) , ti (θi)) 6= (li (θ′i) , ti (θ′i)).
Finally, by the theorem of maximum, li (·) is a continuous function on Θi.
57
A.6.1 The Mechanism
A generic message of agent i is described as follows:
mi =
(
m1i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i
) ∈Mi = M1i ×M2i ×M3i = Θi ×Θ× X¯.
That is, agent i is asked to make (1) one announcement about agent i’s type (i.e., m1i );
and (2) one announcement about the state (i.e., m2i ); and (3) one announcement about the
allocation (i.e., m3i ). As in the main text, we write m
2
i,j = θ˜j if agent i reports in m
2
i that
agent j’s type is θ˜j.
A.6.1.1 Allocation Rule
For each message profile m ∈M , the allocation is defined as follows:
g (m) =
1
I(I − 1)
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6=i
[
ei,j (mi,mj)
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ei,j (mi,mj))Bm3j
(
m2i
)]
where yk (θk) = (lk (θk) , t1 (θk) , ..., tI (θk)) is the dictator lottery for agent k with type θk
defined in Claim 15 and
ei,j (mi,mj) ≡ min
{
max
{
d
(
m2i ,m
2
j
)
, ρ¯
(
m3j ,m
2
i
)3}
, 1
}
.
For each m, let
Ci,j(m) ≡ ei,j (mi,mj) 1
I
∑
k∈I
yk
(
m1k
)
+ (1− ei,j (mi,mj))Bm3j
(
m2i
)
.
Thus, with probability 1
I(I−1) an ordered pair (i, j) is chosen, then Ci,j(m) is implemented.
Claim 16 g : M → X is an analytic function. Moreover, if the setting is compact and
continuous, then g is a continuous function.
Proof. It follows from Claims 14 and 15 that g is analytic; moreover, if the setting is
compact and continuous, then g is continuous.
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A.6.1.2 Transfer Rule
We now define the transfer rule.
For any message profile m ∈ M and agent i chosen, we specify the transfer to agent i
as follows:
τi(m) =
∑
j 6=i
[
τ 1i,j(m) + τ
2
i,j(m)
]
Given a message profile m and agent j, let m˜i =
(
m1i ,
(
m1j ,m
2
i,−j
)
,m3i
)
(which replaces
m2i,j in mi by m
1
j), mˆi =
(
m1i ,
(
m2j,j,m
2
i,−j
)
,m3i
)
(which replaces m2i,j in mi by m
2
j,j), and
m¯i =
(
m1i ,
(
m2j,i,m
2
i,−i
)
,m3i
)
.
We define τ 1i,j and τ
2
i,j as follows:
τ 1i,j (m) = − sup
θ˜i
∣∣∣ui(g (m) , θ˜i)− ui(g (m/m˜i) , θ˜i)∣∣∣
+ sup
θ˜i
∣∣∣ui(g (m/mˆi) , θ˜i)− ui(g (m/m˜i) , θ˜i)∣∣∣ (29)
+dj
(
m2j,j,m
1
j
)− dj(m2i,j,m1j),
where m/mˆi ≡ (mˆi,m−i) and similarly m/m˜i ≡ (m˜i,m−i). Observe that τ 1i,j satisfies two
important properties: (1) ui(g (m/mˆi) , θ˜i)− ui(g (m/m˜i) , θ˜i) remains constant regardless of
agent i’s choice of m2i,j (2) τ
1
i,j (m) = 0 if m
2
i,j = m
2
j,j.
τ 2i,j (m) = − sup
θ˜i
∣∣∣ui(g (m) , θ˜i)− ui(g (m/m¯i) , θ˜i)∣∣∣− di(m2i,i,m2j,i) (30)
Claim 17 τi : M → R is an analytic function. Moreover, if the setting is compact and
continuous, then τi (·) is a continuous function.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2.17 of Stinchcombe and White (1992) that τi is analytic.
Suppose that the setting is compact and continuous. Then, by Claim 16, g is also continuous
on M . Moreover, by the theorem of maximum, τ 1ij (·) and τ 2ij (·) are continuous on M. Hence
τ 1ij (·) and τ 2ij (·) are both continuous.
Hence, with the claims above, we have thatM = (M, g, τ) is a mechanism with compact
sets of messages, a continuous outcome function, and continuous transfer rules. Thus, in the
complete-information game induced by the mechanism, there exists a mixed-strategy NE.
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To show that implementation is achieved by the constructed mechanism, we only em-
phasize the differences from the argument in finite state space. Before we provide the main
argument, we establish two lemmas which play an important role in the proof of Theorem
6.
Throughout the proof, we denote by θ the true state. First, we show that it is strictly
worse for any agent to challenge the truth.
Lemma 4 Let m be a message profile such that m2k = θ for all k. Then, uj(Ck,j (m) , θj) <
uj(f(θ), θj) for all x with Bx(θ) 6= f(θ) .
Proof. Note that whenever Bx (θ) 6= f (θ), we have ui (Bx (θ) , θi) < ui (f (θ) , θi) . Moreover,
since ui
(
1
I
∑
k∈I yk (θ
′
k) , θi
)
< ui (f (θ) , θi), we conclude that
uj(Ck,j (m) , θj) < uj(f(θ), θj) if Bm3j (θ) 6= f(θ). (31)
This completes the proof.
Second, whenever SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩ SU j(f(θ˜), θi) 6= ∅, we show that it is strictly better
for agent j to challenge.
Lemma 5 Let m be a message profile, θ˜ be a state such that m2k = θ˜ for all k ∈ I and
SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩ SU j(f(θ˜), θi) 6= ∅ for some i, j ∈ I. Then, uj(Ck,j (m) , θj) > uj(f(θ˜), θj)
for some x with Bx(θ˜) 6= f(θ˜).
Proof. We choose m3j = x ∈ SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩ SU j(f(θ˜), θi) ∩ X¯ and ε ∈ (0, 1) such that
ε (−3D) + (1− ε3) [uj (x, θj)− uj (f(θ˜), θj)] > 0. (32)
and
ε2
1− ε2 < ρ¯(x, θ˜) < ε. (33)
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Now,
uj(Ck,j (m) , θj)− uj(f(θ˜), θj)
= ei,j (mi,mj)uj
(
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk(m
1
k), θj
)
+ (1− ei,j (mi,mj))uj
(
Bx
(
m2i
)
, θj
)− uj(f(θ˜), θj)
= ρ¯(x, θ˜)3uj
(
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk(m
1
k), θj
)
+ (1− ρ¯(x, θ˜)3)uj(l(x, f(θ˜)), θj)− uj(f(θ˜), θj)
> ε3[uj
(
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk(m
1
k), θj
)
− uj
(
f(θ˜), θj)
]
+
(
1− ε3) [uj ( ρ¯(x, θ˜)
1 + ρ¯(x, θ˜)
x+
1
1 + ρ¯(x, θ˜)
f(θ˜), θj
)]
− uj(f(θ˜), θj)
> ε3
[
uj
(
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk(m
1
k), θj
)
− uj(f(θ˜), θj)
]
+
(
1− ε3) [ ρ¯(x, θ˜)
1 + ρ¯(x, θ˜)
uj (x, θj)− ρ¯(x, θ˜)
1 + ρ¯(x, θ˜)
uj(f(θ˜), θj)
]
> ε3
[
uj
(
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk(m
1
k), θj
)
− uj(f(θ˜), θj)
]
+
(
1− ε3) ε2 [uj (x, θj)− uj(f(θ˜), θj)]
= ε2
[
ε
(
uj
(
1
I
∑
k∈I
yk(m
1
k), θj
)
− uj(f(θ˜), θj)
)
+
(
1− ε3) [uj (x, θj)− uj(f(θ˜), θj)]]
> ε2
[
ε (−3D) + (1− ε3) [uj (x, θj)− uj(f(θ˜), θj)]]
> 0
where the second equality follows from the fact that ei,j (mi,mj) = ρ¯(x, θ˜)
3 since
m2i = m
2
j ; the third inequality is due to that ρ¯(x, θ˜) < ε and uj(
1
I
∑
k∈I yk (m
1
k) , θj) <
uj(l(x, f(θ˜)), θj); the fifth inequality follows from that
ρ¯(x,θ˜)
1+ρ¯(x,θ˜)
> ε2 due to inequality (33),
and the last inequality follows from inequality (32).
A.6.2 Existence of Good Equilibrium
Consider an arbitrary true state θ = (θi)i∈I .
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we argue that truth-telling m where
mi = (θi, θ, x) for each i ∈ I constitutes a pure-strategy equilibrium, where Bx (θ) = f (θ).
Under the message profile m, ei,j(mi,mj) = 0. Firstly, reporting m˜i with either m˜
2
i,i 6= θi
or m˜2i,j 6= θj suffers the penalty of τ 2i,j (m) or τ 1i,j (m) and hence cannot be a profitable
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deviation by Claim 18. Secondly, reporting m˜i with m˜
2
i = θ and m˜
3
i = x
′ 6= x either leads to
Bx′(θ) = f(θ) and results in no change in payoff or Bx′(θ) 6= f(θ) which is strictly worse than
f(θ). By Lemma 4, this is not a profitable deviation. Finally, reporting m˜i with m˜
2
i = θ,
m˜3i = θi, and m˜
1
i 6= θi does not affect the allocation or transfer, since we still have τi (m) = 0
and ej,k(mj,mk) = 0 for every j and k.
In the second part, we show that for any Nash equilibrium σ of the game Γ(M, θ) and
any m ∈supp(σ), g (m) = f (θ) and τi (m) = 0 for any i ∈ I. The proof of the second part is
divided into three steps: (Step 1) contagion of truth: if agent j announces his type truthfully
in his first report, then every agent must also report agent j’s type truthfully in their second
report; (Step 2) consistency : every agent reports the same state θ˜ in the second report; and
(Step 3) no challenge: no agent challenges the common reported state θ˜, i.e., Bm3j (θ˜) = f(θ˜)
for any j ∈ I. Then, consistency implies that τi (m) = 0 for any i ∈ I, whereas no challenge
is invoked and monotonicity of f together with Lemma 5 implies that g (m) = f(θ˜) = f (θ).
We now establish Steps 1 through 3.
A.6.3 Contagion of Truth
Claim 18 We establish two results:
(a) If agent j reports the truth in his first report (i.e., m1j = θj for any mj ∈supp(σj)), then
every agent i 6= j must report agent j’s type truthfully in his second report (i.e., m2i,j = θj
for any mi ∈supp(σi)).
(b) If every agent i reports a fixed type θ˜j of agent j in his second report with probability one
(i.e., m2i,j = θ˜j for any mi ∈supp(σi)), then agent j must report his own type truthfully in
his second report (i.e., m2j,j = θj for any mj ∈supp(σj)).
Proof. First, we prove part (a). That is, for any (mi,m−i) , if m2i,j 6= m1j for some j, we
show that
ui (g (m/m˜i) , θi) + τi (m/m˜i) > ui (g (m) , θi) + τi (m)
Notice that τ 2i,k(m/m˜i) = τ
2
i,k(m) for any k 6= i and τ 1i,k (m/m˜i) = τ 1i,k (m) for any k 6= j.
Thus, in terms of transfers,
τi (m/m˜i)− τi (m) = τ 1i,j (m/m˜i)− τ 1i,j (m)
= sup
θ′i
|ui (g (m) , θ′i)− ui (g (m/m˜i) , θ′i)|+ dj
(
m2i,j,m
1
j
)
62
Thus we have
{ui (g (m/m˜i) , θi) + τi (m/m˜i)} − {ui (g (m) , θi) + τi (m)}
= ui (g (m/m˜i) , θi)− ui (g (m) , θi) + τ 1i,j (m/m˜i)− τ 1i,j (m)
= ui (g (m/m˜i) , θi)− ui (g (m) , θi)
+ sup
θ′i
|ui (g (m) , θ′i)− ui (g (m/m˜i) , θ′i)|
+dj
(
m2i,j,m
1
j
)
> 0.
Second, we prove part (b). That is, for any mi,m−i, if m2j,j 6= m2i,j = m2k,j for any
i, k ∈ I\ {j} , we show that
uj (g (m/m¯j) , θj) + τj (m/m¯j) > uj (g (m) , θj) + τj (m)
Notice that τ 1j,i(m/m¯j) = τ
1
j,i(m).
τj (m/m¯j)− τj (m) =
∑
i 6=j
{
τ 2j,i (m/m¯j)− τ 2j,i (m)
}
=
∑
i 6=j
 supθ′j
∣∣uj (g (m) , θ′j)− uj (g (m/m˜j) , θ′j)∣∣
+dj
(
m2j,j,m
2
i,j
)

It suffices to show that for any i 6= j,
uj (Cj,i (m/m¯j) , θj) + τ
2
j,i (m/m¯j) > uj (Cj,i (m) , θj) + τ
2
j,i (m)
Thus we have
{uj (g (m/m¯j) , θj) + τj (m/m¯j)} − {uj (g (m) , θj) + τj (m)}
= uj (g (m/m¯j) , θj)− uj (g (m) , θj) + τ 2j,i (m/m¯j)− τ 2j,i (m)
= uj (g (m/m¯j) , θj)− uj (g (m) , θj)
+
∑
i 6=j
 supθ′j
∣∣uj (g (m) , θ′j)− uj (g (m/m˜j) , θ′j)∣∣
+dj
(
m2j,j,m
2
i,j
)

> 0.
This completes the proof.
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A.6.4 Consistency
The argument for consistency follows verbatim as in the counterpart proof of Theorem 2.
A.6.5 No Challenge
Claim 19 No one challenges the common state announced in the second report, i.e., Bm3j (θ˜) =
f(θ˜) for any j ∈ I.
Proof. By Claim 4, it sufficies to show that SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j) ∩ SUj(f(θ˜), θj) = ∅. Suppose to
the contrary that SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j)∩SUj(f(θ˜), θj) 6= ∅. Then, we first show that Bm3j (θ˜) 6= f(θ˜)
for every mj ∈supp(σj). Indeed, by Lemma 5, there exists x ∈ SLj(f(θ˜), θ˜j)∩SUj(f(θ˜), θj).
If Bm3j (θ˜) = f(θ˜), then m˜j =
(
m1j ,m
2
j , x
)
is a strictly profitable deviation from announcing
mj. This deviation results in the better allocation Bm˜3j (θ˜) ∈ SUj(f(θ˜), θj). Hence, we
have Bm3j (θ˜) 6= f(θ˜) for every mj ∈supp(σj). Finally, it follows that the dictator lottery
is triggered with positive probability. Thus, by (4), each agent i has strict incentive to
announce the true type in his first report, i.e., m1i = θi for each mi ∈supp(σi) and agent
i ∈ I. By Claim 18, we conclude that θ˜ = θ and hence SLj(f(θ), θj) ∩ SUj(f(θ), θj) 6= ∅,
which is impossible.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 7
A.7.1 Proof of the Only-If Part
In the proof, Claim C from Mezzetti and Renou (2012) plays an important role which is
reproduced as follows:
Claim 20 Suppose that Li (f (θ) , θi) ⊂ Li (f (θ) , θ′i) and SLi (f (θ) , θi) ⊂ SLi (f (θ) , θ′i) .
Then, given any cardinal representation vi (·, θi) of <θii , there exists a cardinal representation
vi (·, θ′) of <θ
′
i
i such that vi (a, θ
′) ≤ vi (a, θ) for all a ∈ A and vi (f (θ) , θ′) = vi (f (θ) , θ)
Suppose f is ordinally Nash implementable but not almost monotonic. That is, for each
agent i, we have Li (f (θ) , θi) ⊂ Li (f (θ) , θ′i) and SLi (f (θ) , θi) ⊂ SLi (f (θ) , θ′i), but f (θ) 6=
f (θ′) . By our hypothesis of implementation, we have that for any cardinal representation vi,
there exists pure-strategy Nash equilibrium m∗ such that g (m∗) = f (θ). Since f (θ) 6= f (θ′),
m∗ cannot be a Nash equilibrium at state θ′ for any cardinal representation. Let ui be the
64
quasilinear preference induced by vi. Then, there exists an agent i, and a message mi such
that
vi
(
g
(
m∗i ,m
∗
−i
)
, θ
)
+ τi
(
m∗i ,m
∗
−i
) ≥ vi (g (mi,m∗−i) , θ)+ τi (mi,m∗−i) ;
vi
(
g
(
m∗i ,m
∗
−i
)
, θ′
)
+ τi
(
m∗i ,m
∗
−i
)
< vi
(
g
(
mi,m
∗
−i
)
, θ′
)
+ τi
(
mi,m
∗
−i
)
.
Summing up the two inequalities, we obtain
vi
(
g
(
m∗i ,m
∗
−i
)
, θ
)− vi (g (m∗i ,m∗−i) , θ′) > vi (g (mi,m∗−i) , θ)− vi (g (mi,m∗−i) , θ′) . (34)
Note that g
(
m∗i ,m
∗
−i
)
= f (θ) . By Claim 20, we can construct cardinal utility representation
vi (·, θ′) of <θ
′
i
i such that vi (a, θ
′) ≤ vi (a, θ) for all a ∈ A and vi (f (θ) , θ′) = vi (f (θ) , θ) .
Therefore, the left-hand side of (34) is zero, while the right-hand side is non-negative. This
is a contradiction and hence we complete the proof.
A.7.2 Proof of the If Part
Let f be an SCF which is ordinally almost monotonic on Θ. Define V θ = ×i∈IV θi with a
generic element vθ. Thanks to Assumption 3, θ 6= θ′ implies that θii 6=θ
′
i
i for some agent
i. Hence, {V θ : θ ∈ Θ} forms a partition of Θ∗ ≡ ∪θ∈ΘV θ which is the set of all cardinal
utility profiles of agent i induced by Θ. Observe that Θ∗ is a Polish space.24 For notational
simplicity, we write θ∗i as a generic element in Θ
∗
i and θ
∗ = (θ∗i )i∈I . Let f
∗ : Θ∗ → A be the
SCF on Θ∗ induced by f such that f ∗ (θ∗) = f (θ) if and only if θ∗ ∈ V θ.
We prove the if-part by establishing two claims: First, we show that f ∗ is Maskin-
monotonic in Claim 21. Hence, Theorem 6 implies that f ∗ is implementable in Nash equi-
librium on Θ∗. Second, it follows from Claim 22 that f is ordinally Nash implementable on
Θ.
24Since any product or disjoint union of a countable family of Polish spaces remains a Polish space (see
Proposition A.1(b) in p. 550 of Treves (2016)), it suffices to argue that V θi is a Polish space. Indeed, let
V = [0, 1]
|A|
be the set of possible cardinalizations. We may write V θi =
⋂
a∈A V
θ
i,a where for each a ∈ A, we
set
V θi,a ≡
⋂
{
b∈A:aθii b
} {v ∈ V : v (a) > v (b)}
⋂ ⋂
{
b∈A:a∼θii b
} {v ∈ V : v (a) = v (b)} .
It follows that V θi is a finite intersection of open subsets and closed subsets of the Polish space V and hence
remains a Polish space (see Proposition A.1(a)(c)(e) in p. 550 of Treves (2016)).
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Claim 21 If f is ordinally almost monotonic, then f ∗ is (strictly) Maskin-monotonic.
Proof. Consider θ∗ and θ˜∗ in Θ∗ such that f ∗ (θ∗) 6= f ∗(θ˜∗). Then, there must exist
θ, θ˜ ∈ Θ such that f (θ) 6= f(θ˜), θ∗ ∈ V θ, and θ˜∗ ∈ V θ˜, respectively. Since f is or-
dinal almost monotonic, there exist some agent i and some outcome a and a′ such that
either a ∈ Li(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩ SUi(f(θ˜), θi) or a′ ∈ SLi(f(θ˜), θ˜i) ∩ Ui(f(θ˜), θi). Then, choose ei-
ther ti < 0 such that (a, (ti,0)) ∈ SLi(f ∗(θ˜∗), θ˜∗i ) ∩ SU i(f ∗(θ˜∗), θ∗i ) or t′i > 0 such that
(a′, (t′i,0)) ∈ SLi(f ∗(θ˜∗), θ˜∗i ) ∩ SU i(f ∗(θ˜∗), θ∗i ) where 0 ∈ RI−1 means zero transfer to any
player j 6= i. Hence, f ∗ is strictly Maskin-monotonic on Θ∗.
Claim 22 If f ∗ is implementable in Nash equilibrium, then f is ordinally Nash imple-
mentable.
Proof. Suppose an SCF f ∗ is implementable in Nash equilibrium on Θ∗. Then, there ex-
ists a mechanism M = ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I such that for any state θ∗ ∈ Θ∗ and m ∈ M ,
(i) there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game Γ(M, θ∗); and (ii) m ∈
supp (NE(Γ(M, θ∗))) ⇒ g (m) = f ∗ (θ∗) and τi (m) = 0 for every i ∈ I. Thus, for any
state θ∗ ∈ V θ, we must have (i) there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game
Γ(M, θ, vθ∗); and (ii) m ∈ supp (NE(Γ(M, θ, vθ∗))) ⇒ g (m) = f (θ) and τi (m) = 0 for
every i ∈ I. Hence, f is ordinally Nash implementable on Θ.
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